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THE PROBLEM OF FAMILY SUPPORT:
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS FOR THE
ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT
SYBIL M. JONES*
A SURVEY OF THE LAW OF ABANDONMENT AND NONSUPPORT
OF SPOUSE, CHILD AND PARENT IN NORTH CAROLINA
The problem of family desertion is becoming increasingly acute.
Studies show that approximately one million women and children a
year are affected by desertion of the breadwinner or by non-support after
a voluntary separation of the members of the basic family group.' Gen-
erally, the acuteness of the problem may be attributed to the cumulative
effects of the circumstances which have operated to produce a higher
degree of family instability-namely, the world wars, the industrializa-
tion and urbanization of society, the high mobility of the population, the
shift in emphasis from spiritual and moral values to materialistic values,
and, in some measure, the emancipation of women.
Studies also show that the family is usually deserted by the husband,
who traditionally in our society has the primary responsibility for the
care and maintenance of the members of the family unit. In addition to
the contributing factors above, the husband's desire to escape financial
responsibility, dissatisfaction with the marital relation, personal malad-
justment, emotional immaturity, alcoholism, and inability to find ade-
quately paying employment is a factor which increases the problem of
family desertion.2
While the deserted family is immediately affected by desertion of the
breadwinner, ultimately, the community as a whole feels the impact of
the abnegation of family responsibilities by the one legally obligated to
maintain the family. In June 1957 there were 63,922 recipients of aid
to dependent children in North Carolina. At the same time 647,208
families throughout the nation were receiving such aid. Expenditures
from federal, state, and local funds for the aid to dependent children
program during the 1956 calendar year amounted to 16,000,000 dollars
in North Carolina and 731,802,000 dollars for the country as a whole.3
Until recently there have been no effective legal remedies, common
law or statutory, for coping with the problems of abandonment and non-
* Associate Professor of Law, North Carolina College.
Von Otterstedt, Reciprocal Support Legislation, in CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE
LEGISLATON 165 (1952).
2 THORMAN, BROKEN HoMEs (Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 135, 1947) ; Tunley,
Family Fugitives-Why Millionr Run Away From Honte, 157 AmRRicAN MAGA-
ZINE 30 (1954).
'COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, BOOK OF TEE STATES 338-39 (1958).
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support of dependents. Especially has this been true in the cases where
the family deserter resorted to the "poor man's divorce," that is, left the
state for the purpose of avoiding his duty to support his family, thereby
creating a problem of interstate enforcement of family support duties;
for it is in these cases that the concomitants of a system of multiple
sovereignties-namely, concepts of jurisdiction, full faith and credit,
comity and reciprocity-operate to complicate further an already complex
problem and militate against a workable solution to a problem that is no
longer one of local concern only.
The purpose of this article is to survey the law of family support and
examine the remedies, common law and statutory, civil and criminal,
for the enforcement of duties of support, with particular emphasis on the
use of criminal sanctions for the enforcement of support.
I
HUSBAND'S DUTY To SUPPORT WIFE
If there is one duty to provide support that is unquestioned, it is that
of a husband to support his wife. At common law a husband is bound to
support and maintain his wife,4 and, according to most authorities, his
immediate family.5 This duty, one of the most fundamental in the law
of domestic relations, is something more than a mere moral obligation;
it is a duty imposed by law.6 Although it is universally agreed that the
husband's obligation to maintain his wife and family exists apart from
statute,7 nevertheless, the obligation is now everywhere expressly im-
posed upon the husband by statute.8
' State v. Lucas, 242 N.C. 84, 86 S.E.2d 770 (1955) ; State v. Clark, 234 N.C.
192, 66 S.E.2d 669 (1951) ; Ritchie v. White, 225 N.C. 450, 35 S.E.2d 414(1945) ;
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N.C. 254, 180 S.E. 70 (1935); 26 Am. Jun. Huband
and Wife §§ 337-40 (1940) ; 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 15 (1944) ; MADDEN,
PERSONS AND Dom-Eic RELATIONS §§ 58-60 (1931).
' Joyner v. McMurphy, 26 Ala. App. 549, 163 So. 533 (1935); Phillips v. Phil-
lips, 1 App. Div. 2d 393, 150 N.Y.S.2d 646 (1956), aff'd, 2 N.Y.2d 742, 138 N.E.2d
738, 157 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1956); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 163 Misc. 98, 297 N.Y. Supp.
642 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1937). The term "family" is one of varied meanings. In
a broad sense it refers to a collective body of persons, usually related by con-
sanguinity and affinity, "who live in the same household, subject to the general
management and control of the head thereof ... " McGee v. Crawford, 205 N.C.
318, 321, 171 S.E. 326, 327 (1933). In a narrow, restricted sense "family" means
a father, mother and children, whether living together or not. Higgins v. Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., 127 Md. 171, 172, 96 Atl. 322, 323 (1915). In the law of
abandonment and support the term "family" usually has the latter meaning, with
the further qualification that "children" generally refers to minor, unemancipated
children. As to the liability of the father for the support of his children, see the
discussion in Part III infra.
'Joel Bailey Davis, Inc. v. Poole, 194 Ga. 824, 22 S.E.2d 795 (1942); Lyons
v. Schanbacher, 316 Ill. 569, 147 N.E. 440 (1925) ; Fink v. Fink, 139 Misc. 630,
248 N.Y. Supp. 129 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
Brown v. Brown, 199 N.C. 473, 154 S.E. 731 (1930) ; Anderson v. Anderson,
140 Okla. 168, 282 Pac. 335 (1929) ; 26 Am. Jum. Husband and Wife § 337 (1940);
41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 15,(1944).8 D. H. Holmes Co. v. Morris, 188 La. 431, 177 So. 417 (1937); Labadie v.
Henry, 132 Okla. 252, 270 Pac. 57 (1928). Some of the statutes are criminal
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The husband's duty does not arise out of contract and it is not a
debt; it is a necessary incident of the marital relationship 9 and exists
during the continuance of that relationship.10 His duty is sometimes
said to be a public one, owed not only to his wife and family, but to the
state, to see that his wife and family do not fall into necessitous circum-
stances and thereby become charges of the state and a burden to the
taxpayers." In fact, the duty is based on considerations of public policy
and the interest of the state in promoting and maintaining family stability
and the economic independence of the basic family unit. The require-
ment that the husband shall support his wife in sickness and in health
is grounded on principles of public policy; therefore, the husband can-
not shirk it or transfer it to others, even by contract. While a husband
and wife may contract with one another prior to marriage with respect
to their mutual property rights, they cannot vary their personal duties
and obligations to each other which ensue from the marital relationship
itself. Thus, an antenuptial promise by a husband to care for, nurse,
and support his wife after their marriage is a promise only to do that
which the law requires of him in any event and is no consideration for
an agreement by his wife to bequeath him her property.12 A fortiori, a
husband cannot by postnuptial contract relieve himself of the duty to
support his family.' 3 Although a husband may enter into contracts with
statutes penalizing abandonment and nonsupport of the spouse. 3 VRNIEI, AMaE-
cAN FAMILY LAWs § 162 (1935). See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-325 (1953);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-322 (Supp. 1959). Others are "family responsibility"
statutes. A family responsibility statute is a statute designed to alleviate the
public burden of caring for the indigent by requiring those persons closely re-
lated to them by consanguinity or affinity to provide support for them. Such
statutes are usually part of an overall legislative scheme to provide for aid to
persons not covered by other public welfare measures-for example, old age assist-
ance, aid to dependent children, and aid to the blind. American family responsi-
bility laws are patterned after the Elizabethan Poor Laws: Poor Law, 1575, 18
Eliz. 1, c. 3, which required parents to support their illegitimate children in order
to relieve the parish of that burden; Poor Law, 1597, 39 Eliz. 1, c. 3, which re-
quired parents and children to support each other lest the parish be burdened with
their care; and Poor Law, 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 2, § 7, which extended the duty to
provide support to additonal relatives, lineal and collateral, who were poor and in
need of support.
'Kearney v. Kearney, 178 Miss. 766, 174 So. 59 (1937); Haas v. Haas, 298
N.Y. 69, 80 N.E.2d 337 (1948) ; Cook v. Cook, 213 S.C. 247, 49 S.E.2d 9 (1948).
10 Wohlfort v. Wohlfort, 116 Kan. 154, 225 Pac. 746 (1924). It is recognized
that a husband's duty to support his wife may survive the termination of the mari-
tal relation where the wife obtains a decree for permanent alimony. However, a
discussion of alimony is beyond the scope of this paper. See generally Note, 29
N.C.L. REv. 445 (1951) ; Note, 31 N.C.L. RF. 482 (1953) ; Note, 35 N.C.L. Rnv.
405 (1957).
" Clisby v. Clisby, 160 Ala. 572, 49 So. 445 (1909) ; Ritchie v. White, 225 N.C.
450, 35 S.E.2d 414 (1945).
12 Ryan v. Dockery, 134 Wis. 431, 114 N.W. 820 (1908), a case of first impres-
sion upon the right of a husband to recover on an antenuptial contract for the care
and support of his wife.
"Long v. Crosson, 119 Ind. 3, 21 N.E. 450 (1889) ; Garlock v. Garlock, 279
N.Y. 337, 18 N.E.2d 521 (1939), reversing 255 App. Div. 88, 5 N.Y.S.2d 619
(1938), reargurnent denied, 225 App. Div. 752, 7 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1938) ; Ritchie v.
White, 225 N.C. 450, 35 S.E.2d 414 (1945).
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others to make provisions for the support of his wife, he cannot by ex-
press contract with third persons or his wife relieve himself of the duty
imposed by law to support her. In Corcoran v. Corcoran4 the husband
conveyed to his wife a house and lot in consideration of her promise to
provide the family support and maintenance. Upon default by his wife,
the husband sued her for damages for breach of contract. The court held
the contract unenforceable. In the course of its opinion the court said :,
The law makes it the duty of the husband not only to support
himself, but his wife and children as well, and we know of no rule
of law or of public policy which gives any countenance to an at-
tempt by a husband to abdicate the duty which the law casts upon
him, and impose it as an obligation upon his wife through the
medium of an ordinary oral contract ....
Under the enlightened policy of modern legislation, married
women have been relieved of many common law disabilities, but
we have not yet progressed so far as to enable a married woman
to bind herself by contract with her husband to assume his obli-
gation to furnish support for both.' 6
As between the husband and wife, the husband and his wife's rela-
tives, the husband and other third persons, and the husband and the
state, he is primarily obligated to support his wife. The common law
duty of support owed by the husband does not depend upon the adequacy
or inadequacy of his wife's means,"t her equal or superior ability to take
care of herself,18 the fact that she has a separate estate,19 or a demand
by her for support.20 Even the fact that the husband is under a partial
or total legal disability such as infancy,2 insanity,22 or imprisonment 28
does not relieve him of the obligation to support his wife. In Reynolds
v. Reynolds24 the North Carolina court held that the wife of an insane
beneficiary of a trust agreement has the right to support and maintenance
from the income of the trust when the income substantially exceeds the
needs of the beneficiary in providing him with expert medical attention,
care, and maintenance. The court cited McLean v. Breece,25 where it
was held that allowances may be made from the property of an insane
person for his support and the support of his wife, on the principle that
14 119 Ind. 138, 21 N.E. 468 (1889). '-Id. at 140, 21 N.E. at 468.
16 This passage was quoted with approval in Ritchie v. White, 225 N.C. 450,
35 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1945).
17 Heflin v. Heflin, 177 Va. 385, 14 S.E.2d 317 (1941).
'8 Mengal v. Mengal, 201 Misc. 104, 103 N.Y.S.2d 992 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1951).
1 Rowe v. Rowe, 256 Ala. 491, 55 So. 2d 749 (1951).
20 Caldwell v. J. A. Kreis & Sons, 227 Mo. App. 120, 50 S.W.2d 725 (1932).
21Fisher v. Drew, 247 Mass. 178, 141 N.E. 875 (1924).2.Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N.C. 254, 180 S.E. 70 (1935); Read v. Turner,
200 N.C. 773, 158 S.E. 475 (1931) ; Anderson v. Anderson, 183 N.C. 139, 110 S.E.
863 (1922); McLean v. Breece, 113 N.C. 391, 18 S.E. 694 (1893); McLean v.
Breece, 109 N.C. 564, 13 S.E. 910 (1891) ; In re Latham, 39 N.C. 231 (1846).2 Ahern v. Easterby, 42 Conn. 546 (1875).
24208 N.C. 254, 180 S.E. 70 (1935). 20113 N.C. 391, 18 S.E. 694 (1893).
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an insane husband owes a legal duty of supporting and maintaining his
wife, and that the court would not order payment of an insane person's
debts if such an order would have the effect of depriving him or his
family of maintenance.
Regardless of the seemingly unavoidable nature of the husband's duty
of support, nevertheless, it is not an unqualified duty. Ordinarily, the
husband's duty is to support his wife at the matrimonial domicile; and
if the wife refuses to live with him without just cause, he is under no duty
to support her.2G However, the husband remains under an obligation
to support his wife if they are living separate and apart by mutual agree-
ment,27 because the wife's health requires it, or because the husband's
misconduct has forced the wife to seek shelter elsewhere.28  On the other
hand, the wife is not entitled to support during a separation due to her
fault ;29 and she may forfeit her right to support by conduct constituting
a matrimonial offense sufficient to entitle her husband to a divorce. 30
Furthermore, the support that the husband is legally required to furnish
his wife and family is only to an extent commensurate with his means,
earning capacity, and social position.3 ' However, the fact that the hus-
band is presently without means or is destitute does not discharge him
from the duty to support his wife, although it may be some excuse for a
present failure. In most cases in which the question of the effect of the
poverty of the husband has arisen, it has been held that the absence of
an estate or fixed income on the part of the husband is no defense to an
action for support and does not relieve the husband of his personal duty
to exert himself to support his wife and family.32
Extensive changes have been made in the law of domestic relations
in every jurisdiction by statute. One need think only of the laws relating
21 Pollard v. Pollard, 221 N.C. 46, 19 S.E.2d 1 (1942) ; Byrum v. Byrum, 207
N.C. 655, 178 S.E. 97 (1935) ; Byerly v. Byerly, 194 N.C. 532, 140 S.E. 158 (1927).
" Reardon v. Reardon, 210 Ala. 129, 97 So. 138 (1923).
=' Ibid.
State v. Newman, 91 Conn. 6, 98 At. 346 (1916).
"In re Bares Estate, 177 Misc. 578, 31 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Surr. Ct. 1941), aff'd,
266 App. Div. 677, 41 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1943), appeal denied, 266 App. Div. 742, 41
N.Y.S.2d 953 (1943) ; Howell v. Howell, 223 N.C. 62, 25 S.E.2d 169 (1943).
Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N.Y. 337, 18 N.E.2d 521 (1939), reversing 255 App.
Div. 88, 5 N.Y.S.2d 619 (1938), reargument denied, 225 App. Div. 752, 7 N.Y.S.
2d 232 (1938); State v. Lucas, 242 N.C. 84, 86 S.E.2d 770 (1955); State v.
Clark, 234 N.C. 192, 66 S.E.2d 669 (1951).
"' Thomas v. Thomas, 211 Ala. 504, 100 So. 766 (1924). "The rule is well
settled in this State, and elsewhere, that while the husband's current income is the
primary fund looked to for his wife's support . . . nevertheless, the husband's
property and capital assets and his capacity to earn the support awarded by diligent
attention to business-his earning capacity or prospective earnings-are all proper
elements for the court's consideration in fixing the amount of the award.... In
Robbins v. Robbins, supra, 106 NJ. Eq. at p. 200, the court noted in this connection
that ' * * * If it were otherwise, a husband by deliberate intent or disinclination to
work, might defeat or avoid his marital obligation of support.' Parenthetically
there is nothing in the record before us to indicate that the defendant is incapaci-
tated nor otherwise incapable of working nor that his unemployment is other than
temporary." Bonanno v. Bonanno, 4 NJ. 268, 271, 72 A.2d 318, 321 (1950).
1959]
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to married women to realize how little is left of the common law in this
field. Yet the branch of family law relating to the duty of the husband
to support his wife has remained substantiaily the same as it was at
common law. Indeed, legislative enactments in the law of family sup-
port have provided new and more effective methods of enforcing the
husband's duty to support his wife and children. It is almost universally
held that the Married Women's Acts, statutes freeing married women
from most of their common law disabilities with respect to executing
contracts and owning and disposing of property, have not abrogated the
husband's duty to provide support.8  Despite the fact that married
women have moved into the labor market in increasingly large numbers
and have attained a considerable degree of economic self sufficiency, most
women are still primarily housewives performing the important function
of running the household and looking after the welfare of the husband
and children. Our highly mobile, fast moving, tension-ridden society
has tended to produce an increasing number of irresponsible husbands
and fathers who start family groups and then, under various pressures-
social and economic-abandon them as public charges. Legislative at-
tempts to alleviate the problems created by abandonment and nonsupport
have had varying degrees of success.
Enforcement of the husband's obligation to support his wife and
family has always been a major problem. The common law provided no
direct means of compelling the husband to support his wife. Under the
unity doctrine a wife could not sue her husband for any reason at com-
mon law.34 However, a husband could be held liable to third persons
who furnished necessaries-and under some circumstances, non-neces-
saries-to his wife; so, a wife's one recourse was to purchase such goods
and services as she needed, leaving it to the person who furnished the
goods and services to sue her husband. Although a wife has, by virtue
"3French v. McAnarney, 290 Mass. 544, 195 N.E. 714 (1935); Bonanno v.
Bonanno, 4 N.J. 268, 72 A2d 318 (1950). "The mutual rights and duties growing
out of the marital relationship are not affected by the statutes relating to the
capacity of married women to contract and dispose of their property as if they
were unmarried. G.S. § 52-10, et seq.; Bank v. Turner, 202 N.C. 162, 162 S.E.
221." Ritchie v. White, 225 N.C. 450, 452, 35 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1945).
" Thresher v. McElroy, 90 Fla. 372, 106 So. 79 (1925) ; Scholtens v. Scholtens,
230 N.C. 149, 52 S.E.2d 350 (1949); Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 124 S.E. 566
(1924); 27 A3. Jm. Husband and Wife § 584 (1940); 41 CJ.S. Husband and
Wife § 393 (1944) ; MADDEN, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 54, 69. While equity recog-
nized the duality of husband and wife and permitted them to sue each other for
some purposes, particularly where property rights were involved, nevertheless,
equity seized upon the unity concept, which it recognized as being based on sound
public policy, as a ground for refusing to give relief for personal wrongs. 27 Am.
Jim. Husband and Wife § 585 (1940) ; 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 393 (1944).
Almost everywhere now statutes authorize the maintenance of actions between
husband and wife, at least as to some particular matters. The tendency has been,
however, to construe such statutes strictly, as in derogation of the common law.
See, for example, Scholtens v. Scholtens, supra; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1
(Supp. 1959).
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of the marital relationship alone, no authority to bind her husband by
contracts generally, 35 she can bind him by making purchases or incurring
other obligations on his credit in certain cases. (1) The wife may be
the agent of her husband-in incurring debts for non-necessaries as well
as necessaries-and, as such agent, may bind him. This agency arises
from the authority of the husband expressly or impliedly conferred as
in other cases of agency. 30 (2) Jure nuriti the wife may pledge her
husband's credit for the purpose of obtaining those necessaries which the
husband himself has neglected or refused to furnish.3 7 This is sometimes
called an "agency in law" or an "agency of necessity," but that agency
is not the proper basis of the liability is readily apparent from the estab-
lished principle that even an express instruction by the husband to the
third party not to furnish goods and services to the wife does not relieve
him from liability.35 Actually the husband's liability for necessaries is a
rule of law grounded on public policy.89 These indirect methods of
enforcing the husband's duty to support his wife at common law are
obviously crude, cumbersome and unsatisfactory. For example, the
burden of proof is on the creditor attempting to hold a husband liable
for necessaries to show that, among other things, (1) the husband
refused or neglected to provide a suitable support for his wife, and
(2) the articles furnished were necessaries.40
While these remedies are still available in most jurisdictions,41 fre-
quently by statute, 42 other more satisfactory methods of enforcing the
"Bergh v. Warner, 47 Minn. 250, 50 N.W. 77 (1891). "[A] wife is not the
agent of her husband by force of the marital relationship between them." In re
Will of Holmes, 224 N.C. 830, 833, 32 S.E.2d 614, 616 (1944).
"8 This is purely and simply a question of agency and the ordinary rules as to
actual and apparent authority must be applied. Where the wife is living with her
husband, she, as manager of the domestic establishment maintained by her husband,
is presumed to have authority from him to order on his credit such goods and
services as, in the ordinary management of her husband's household, are required
for family use. Bergh v. Warner, supra note 35; Sibley v. Gilmer, 124 N.C. 631,
32 S.E. 964 (1899); Webster v. Laws, 89 N.C. 224 (1883); Cox v. Hoffman, 20
N.C. 319 (1838).
7 Bergh v. Warner, 47 Minn. 250, 50 N.W. 77 (1891); Brown v. Brown, 199
N.C. 473, 154 S.E. 731 (1930) ; Sibley v. Gilmer, supra note 36; Berry v. Hender-
son, 102 N.C. 525, 9 S.E. 455 (1889) ; Pool v. Everton, 50 N.C. 241 (1858).
8 MECHEM, OUTINES OF AGENCY § 49 (4th ed. 1952). "The real foundation
of the husband's liability in such cases is the clear legal duty of every husband to
support his wife, and supply her with necessaries suitable to her situation and his
own circumstances and condition in life." Bergh v. Warner, supra note 37 at 252,
50 N.W. at 78.
"M ECHEM, op. cit. supra note 38, § 49.
'0 Bergh v. Warner, 41 Minn. 250, 50 N.W. 77, 78 (1891). "The term 'neces-
saries,' in its legal sense, as applied to a wife, is not confined to articles of food
and clothing required to sustain life or preserve decency, but includes such articles
of utility, or even ornament, as are suitable to maintain the wife according to the
estate and rank of her husband." Bergh v. Warner, suPra.
"B.rownv. Brown, 199 N.C. 473. 154 S.E. 731 (1930); Sibley v. Gilmer, 124
N.C. 631, 32 S.E. 964 '(1899) ; Berry v. Henderson, 102 N.C. 525, 9 S.E. 455
S1889) ; Pool v. Everton, 50 N.C. 241 (1858) ; 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 50
1944). 1 ( .
" The commoh law liability of the husband for necessaries furnished to the
1959]
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husband's duty to provide support are also avilable. For example, the
duty may be enforced in an action for separate maintenance,43 an action
on a separation agreement,44 by petitioning for alimony in an action for
divorce (a mensa et thoro45 or a vinculo46), by a criminal prosecution
of the husband for abandonment and nonsupport,47 or by a proceeding,




WiFE's DUTY To SUPPORT HUSBAND
Although a married woman may be under a duty to render services
to her husband, 49 she is under no duty at common law to support and
wife is affirmed in whole or in part by statutes in California, Connecticut, District
of Columbia, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Texas and West Virginia. 3 VERNIER, op. cit. supra note 8, § 153.
"'The great majority of jurisdictions permit the wife, on a proper showing, to
obtain an allowance for her separate support and maintenance in an independent
equitable or statutory action brought for this purpose. 42 C.J.S. Husband and
Wife § 610 (1944). In North Carolina alimony without divorce may be obtained
in an independent action, Fogartie v. Fogartie, 236 N.C. 188, 72 S.E.2d 226 (1952),
or by cross action in the husband's suit for divorce a inensa et thoro or a vbzculo,
Beeson v. Beeson, 246 N.C. 330, 98 S.E.2d 17 (1957), under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.
"A separation agreement, the cessation of cohabitation by mutual agreement,
ordinarily provides for separation of the parties and frequently for the support of
the wife or children, or both, during the separation. Such agreements are recog-
nized in North Carolina as valid under certain conditions, Archbell v. Archbell,
158 N.C. 409, 74 S.E. 327 (1912), and enforceable like other contracts, Howland
v. Stitzer, 236 N.C. 230, 72 S.E.2d 583 (1952).
"' Permanent alimony, an allowance for the support of the wife out of the estate
of the husband, may be obtained in an action for divorce a mensa et thoro under
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-14. Rayfield v. Rayfield, 242 N.C. 691, 89 S.E.2d 399 (1955).
,' Although permanent alimony cannot be obtained in North Carolina in con-
nection with an absolute divorce, under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-11, as amended in
1953 and 1955, a wife's right to receive alimony previously established by decree
will not be terminated upon absolute divorce except in cases where the husband
gets the divorce on the ground of the wife's adultery, or the wife gets it on the
ground of two years' separation.
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-322 to -325 (1953), as amended N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
322 (Supp. 1959) ; State v. Lucas, 242 N.C. 84, 86 S.E.2d 770 (1955) ; State v.
Clark, 234 N.C. 192, 66 S.E.2d 669 (1951). See discussion of criminal sanctions
for the enforcement of support in Part VI infra.
"Enacted in North Carolina in 1951, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act, N.C. Gen. Stat., ch. 52A, creates an interstate procedure, by recipro-
cal legislation, for the enforcement of support, thereby increasing the effectiveness
of civil and criminal remedies for that purpose. See discussion of the interstate
attack on the problem of support in Part VIII infra.
"Ritchie v. White, 225 N.C. 450, 35 S.E.2d 414 (1945) ; Helmstetler v. Duke
Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945) ; 26 AM. JuR. Husband and Wife
§ 9 (1940); 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 17 (1944); MADDEN, op. cit. supra
note 4, § 53. "Services" includes society, companionship, love and affection, and
labor in the performance of household and domestic duties. See Hinnant v. Tide-
water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925). In the absence of statute,
a husband is entitled to all the proceeds of his wife's industry. Under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 52-10, the earnings of a married woman are her sole and separate property.
See also N.C. CoNsT. art X, § 36 and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-2 (1950). Apparently
the duties of the wife to her husband are moral rather than legal. The husband is
[Vol. 38
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maintain her husband5" and family.5 Even when the wife possesses a
separate estate, she is not bound to support her husband; and there is
no ground upon which the husband can compel his wife with independent
means to furnish support for him and their family.52  As a general rule,
the husband has no right to resort to his wife's separate estate to sup-
port her and their family.5 3 Further, the statutes enlarging the right of
a married woman to contract and providing that she may deal with her
separate property as if a feme sole do not impose upon the wife a duty
to support her husband.54
In Ritchie v. White,55 a case of first impression in North Carolina,
it was held that a widow was not entitled to recover in quasi-contract
or implied assumpsit the value of domestic services rendered and finan-
cial support furnished the decedent during his declining years and last
illness under an express oral agreement that in exchange for her services
entitled to such domestic services as his wife may choose to perform, and to her
aid, comfort, society, and companionship. Ritchie v. White, supra; Helmstetler v.
Duke Power Co., supra. Nevertheless during the continuance of the marital rela-
tion it seems that there is no way by which the husband can compel his wife to
contribute to the marriage either domestic work or her outside earnings. Under
the legal entity theory, neither husband nor wife can sue each other at common
law. Alexander v. Alexander, 85 Va. 353, 7 S.E. 335 (1888). Equity has always
recognized the right of husband and wife to sue each other. Dyett v. North Ameri-
can Coal Co., 20 Wend. (N.Y.) 570 (Ct. Err. 1838). However, as a general rule,
equity takes cognizance of property rights inter partes and furnishes no relief for
personal wrongs, either during coverture or after the dissolution of the marital
relation.
o Atkins v. Curtis, 259 Ala. 311, 66 So. 2d 455 (1953); Phillips v. Phillips,
1 App. Div. 2d 393, 150 N.Y.S.2d 646 (1956), aff'd, 2 N.Y.2d 742, 138 N.E.2d 738,
157 N.Y.S.2d 378 (Ct. App. 1956); Nilsson v. Nilsson, 200 Misc. 841, 108 N.Y.S.2d
954 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1951); 26 Am. JuR. Husband and Wife §341 (1940); 41
C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 16 (1944) ; MADDEN, op. cit. supra note 4, § 62. The
same rule prevails in equity. Lippincott v. Mitchell, 94 U.S. 767 (1876).
" The general duty to support the wife and family rests on the husband; and if
he is derelict in his duty, he is liable to third persons who furnish necessaries to
his wife and children. See notes 37, 38 and 39 supra and accompanying text.
The inability of a married woman at common law to bind herself by contract pre-
cluded her liability on a contract for necessaries. Shaw v. Thompson, 33 Mass.
198 (1834) ; Bowen v. Daugherty, 168 N.C. 242, 84 S.E. 265 (1915) ; Murray v.
Barlee, 3 Myl. and K. 209, 40 Eng. Rep. 80 (1834); 26 Am. Jum. Husband and
Wife § 350 (1940); 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 63 (1940); MADDEN, op. cit.
supra note 4, §§ 58-60. However, she could charge her separate equitable estate
with the payment of necessaries furnished to her. Frazier v. Brownlow, 38 N.C.
237 (1844).
"Dodge v. Knowles, 114 U.S. 430 (1885). "There is no doubt that in this
state, as between husband and wife, the primary obligation to provide for the
support of his wife and their children rests upon the husband, and that the wife is
not bound to maintain her husband and children, even though she may have a
separate estate." Young v. Valentine, 177 N.Y. 347, 352, 69 N.E. 643, 644 (1904).
The -wife may voluntarily use funds from her estate for the maintenance of the
household. Mayers v. Kaiser, 85 Wis. 382, 55 N.W. 688 (1893). In that event
she is not entitled to reimbursement from her husband or his estate. Spalding v.
Spalding, 361 Ill. 387, 198 N.E. 136 (1935).
" McFerren v. Goldsmith-Stern Co., 137 Md. 573, 113 At. 107 (1921) ; Manu-
facturers Trust Co. v. Gray. 278 N.Y. 380, 16 N.E.2d 373 (1939); Bowen v.
Daugherty, 168 N.C. 242, 84 S.E. 265 (1915).
Lyon v. Lyon, 102 Ga. 453, 31 S.E. 34 (1897).
225 N.C. 450, 35 S.E.2d 414 (1945).
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and care he would devise certain realty to her.5" The court emphasized
that although married couples are free to contract with each other con-
cerning their property rights in the manner provided by statute,57 they
are not at liberty by private agreement to transfer from one to the other
or to absolve either of the obligations which are imposed by the marital
status. Quoting from the Alabama case of Cragford Bank v. Cum-
mings,58 the court pointed out that, " 'The husband, as head of the family,
is charged with its support and maintenance, in return for which he is
entitled to his wife's services in all those domestic affairs which pertain
to the comfort, care, and well being of the family. Her labors are her
contribution to the family support and care .... ."59 Beyond this, the
wife has no duty at common law to support and maintain her husband.10
The common law rule that a wife was under no duty to furnish sup-
port for her husband and family was the natural concomitant of the
disabilities of the feme covert at common law and the doctrine of merger
of the legal existence of the wife with that of her husband. 01 "The posi-
tion of the wife has changed, however. Her role as a frail, sheltered in-
effectual person-if ever authentic-is as much a thing of the past as her
crinoline and whalebone. By statute she has been given exclusive' right
to hold her own property ... and her coequal status with her husband
has been recognized in law as well as in fact."62 The almost total eco-
nomic dependence of the woman that the common law rules on family
support were designed to protect has given way to the economic self-
sufficiency of the modern emancipated woman. With the changing
social and legal status of women, particularly married women, have come
concomitant responsibilities. To some extent these changes are reflected
in statutes affecting married women.
By the weight of authority a so called Married Woman's Act,08 in
" It was conceded that the particular agreement, as a parol promise to devise
realty, was unenforceable under the statute of frauds, N.C. GEN. STAT. §22-2
(1953) ; consequently the plaintiff was remitted to the doctrine of quasi-contract
or implied assumpsit.
"N.C. Gmr. STAT. § 52-10 (1950) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-12, -13 (Supp. 1953).
" 216 Ala. 377, 379, 113 So. 243, 244 (1927).
" Ritchie v. White, 225 N.C. 450, 454, 35 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1945).
0 Upon tle husband's death, the duty to support minor children devolves upon
the surviving widow. See discussion of parent's duty to support child in Part IIIinfra.
ifaSee Perry v. Stancil, 237 N.C. 442, 75 S.E.2d 512 (1953). "The very being
or legal existence of the woman is suspended during marriage, or at least is in-
corporated and consolidated into that of the husband under whose wing, protec-
tion and cover, she performs everything ...." 1 BLAcxsToNE, CommENTAim s
oN TE LAw oF ENGLAND *442. See also 3 HoLDswoRTE, A HIsTORY oF ENGLisn
LAw 520-33 (5th ed. 1942).
02 Phillips v. Phillips, 1 App. Div. 2d 393, 150 N.Y.S.2d 646, 649 (1956), aff'd,
2 N.Y.2d 742, 138 N.E.2d 738, 157 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1956).
"A Married Woman's Act is any statute enlarging the right of the feme covert
to contract, own and dispose of property, sue and be sued, and exercise any rights
she was unable to ex.ercise at common law. Such a statute is usually strictly con-
strued as in derogation of the common law. Appeal of Garland, 126 Me. 84, 136
AtL. 459 (1927), cert. denied sub nomine Petition of Garland, 274 U.S. 759 (1927).
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the absence of express provisions to that effect, does not impose on a
married woman or her estate the duty to support her husband or
family.6" Nor does a "family expense statute '65 impose a duty on the
wife to support her husband, as such. However, the effect of this latter
type of statute is to impose a duty on the wife to support herself, her
husband and her family to the extent that such liability may be enforced
by a creditor.66 Under such a statute the wife's liability for family
expenses is not dependent upon her consent; therefore she may be
charged for goods bought for family use though sold to her husband on
his individual credit.
67
On the other hand, a substantial number of states68 have enacted
legislation expressly imposing upon the wife a duty to support her hus-
band under varying circumstances, usually when the husband is incapaci-
tated, in need, and unable to support himself. Such statutes are usually
part of a scheme of family responsibility legislation and cover other obli-
gations of support. For example, it is provided by statute in California
that every woman shall support her child, her husband, and her
parent when in need. 69 Some of the earlier cases arising under family
responsibility laws which did not specifically name wives construed the
laws as not imposing on married women a duty to provide support, al-
though other female relatives such as mothers and grandmothers not
under coverture were held to be within their coverage.7 6 Many recent
statutes are expressly applicable to wives as well as other female
relatives. 71
",Lyon v. Lyon, 102 Ga. 453, 31 S.E. 34 (1897); Robinson v. Foust, 31 Ind.
App. 384, 68 N.E. 182 (1903); Ritchie v. White, 225 N.C. 450, 35 S.E.2d 414
(1945); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Turner, 202 N.C. 162, 162 S.E. 221
(1932); 26 Am. JuL Husband and Wife §341 (1940); 41 C.J.S. Husband and
Wife § 16 (1944).
"A family expense statute is a statute imposing liability on the husband and
vife personally, or their property, for necessities furnished to the family, or for
family expense. Such statutes, varying in scope and application, may be found
in Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missour6 'Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia,
and Wyoming. 3 VERwxER, AMERCAN FAmyY LAws § 160 (1935). North Caro-
lina does not have a family expense statute.
"13 VERNIER, op. cit. mipra note 65, § 161.
17 Mandell Bros. v. Fogg, 182 Mass. 582, 66 N.E. 198 (1903) (Illinois statute);
Dodd v. St. John, 22 Ore. 250, 29 Pac. 618 (1892).
11 California, Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mon-
tana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Okla-
homa, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.
11 CAL. Crw. CODE § 243.70 In Gleason v. City of Boston, 144 Mass. 25, 10 N.E. 476 (1887), it was held
that a wife was not liable' for the support of her minor children. The courts
took this narrow view in spite of the fact that the family responsibility laws
were based on the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601, which was clearly intended to
change the common law relating to duties of support. Massachusetts enacted a
statute in 1955 which imposes upon both parents a duty to support their minor
children. MAss. GN. LAws Ax. ch. 201, § 40 (1955).
'See, for example, N.Y.C. Dom. RE. CT. Acr § 92. The Domestic Relations
19591
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The conclusion is inescapable, however, that while there have been
statutory modifications of the wife's duties to her husband and family,
the changes have been made on a piecemeal basis, and the ancient con-
cept of the husband as the legal personification of the family unit, and
therefore under an unqualified duty to support it, has remained largely
unchanged.
III
PARENT'S DUTY To SUPPORT CHILD
The authorities are conflicting on the question of whether at common
law independently of statute a parent is under a legal duty to support
and maintain his minor child."2 A few early American cases,78 following
English precedents,74 have held that a parent may be morally obligated
to support his minor child, but that he is not legally obligated to do so
in the absence of statute. Courts following this view refused to hold a
father liable for necessaries furnished to his minor child in the absence
of an agreement, express or implied, to pay for them." However, this
doctrine is generally regarded as contrary to the basic principles of
modern society and has been repudiated in almost every jurisdiction.
It is, of course, universally acknowledged that there is a moral obligation
on the part of a parent to support his child; and the overwhelming
Court is empowered "to make an order requiring a wife, if she is of sufficient
means, to support or contribute to the support of the husband who is or is likely to
become a public charge." Under § 92-A, "The Commissioner of Welfare of the
City of New York, in an appropriate case, may file with the court a petition against
a wife who has sufficient means, for the support of the husband who is or who is
likely to become a public charge." Under § 101, "A wife is hereby declared to be
chargeable with the support of her husband who is or is likely to become a public
charge, and if possessed of sufficient means may be required to pay such sum, or
aiy part thereof, as may be necessary to prevent his being or becoming a public
clarge." See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1972 (Supp. 1957). In Kinsey v.
R insey, 200 Misc. 760, 107 N.Y.S2d 212, 221 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1951), the court
(applying New York family responsibility laws), held that where an adult son,
though industrially disabled by mental deficiency and epilepsy, was married and
lived with his wife on her earnings supplemented by his occasional employment,
and the son was not receiving, or eligible for or in need of, public assistance, there
was no jurisdictional basis for an order requiring the father to support the son.
The court ordered the proceeding terminated, but without prejudice to the filing
of new petitions when and if the son in the future became a recipient of public
assistance or was likely to become in need thereof. The court left undecided the
question whether the statutory obligation of a wife for support of a "poor rela-
tive" husband is primary and the obligation of the parents and children for such
support, under N.Y.C. Dom. Rel. Ct. Act §§ 92(9) and 101(4), is secondary, or
whether they are concurrent and the burden apportionable.
" MADDEN, PERSONS AND Dom-Esnc RELATIONS § 110 (1931).
"Hunt v. Thompson, 4 Ill. 179 (1841) ; White v. Mann. 110 Ind. 74, 10 N.E.
629 (1887) ; Kelley v. Davis, 49 N.H. 187 (1870).." "It is now well established that, except under the operation of the poor law,
there is no legal obligation the part of the father to maintain his child, unless,
indeed, the neglect to do so should bring the case within the criminal law. Civilly
there is no such obligation." Bazeley v. Forder, [18681 3 Q.B. 559 565.
' Hunt v. Thompson, 4 Ill. 179 (1841) ; Kelley v. Davis, 49 N.I. 187 (1870).
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majority view in the United States today is that a parent is also under
a legal duty to support his child, regardless of statute.76
As to the basis of the parental duty of support, there is a diversity of
opinion. It has been said that the rule is required by principles of natu-
ral law and justice; 77 by necessity, from the fact that a child is, by the
nature of things, unable to support and maintain itself ;78 by the state, as
parens patriae ;79 and because the state is concerned that the child should
not become a burden to the taxpayers.8 0 Some courts simply state the
rule, that a parent is under a duty to support his child, as axiomatic: it
arises from parenthood itself.8 ' In any event, there are now in almost
every American jurisdiction civil statutes which impose upon a parent
an obligation to support his minor child ;12 and in every jurisdiction
there is criminal liability for desertion and nonsupport of a minor child.
8
The policy of most of the criminal statutes is not merely that of punishing
a parent for deserting and failing to support his child, but that of en-
forcing the parent's duty of support in order to "relieve the public from
the burden of supporting the child. This is usually done by providing
for the suspension of sentence, stay of execution, and probation of the
defendant upon his entering into an undertaking to comply with a court
order to support or contribute to the support of his child.s
Primarily, it is the father who has the duty to support and educate
his minor children,8 5 and in the absence of statute, the mother is not
bound to support the children during the father's lifetime.8 6 However,
"o "There can be no controversy that the father is under a legal as well as a
moral duty to support his infant children, . . . and ... if he has the ability to do so,
whether they have property or not" Sanders v. Sanders, 167 N.C. 319, 83 S.E.
490, 491 (1914). Accord, Lee v. Coffield, 245 N.C. 570, 96 S.E.2d 726 (1957) ;
State v. Robinson, 245 N.C. 10, 95 S.E.2d 126 (1956) ; Pace v. Pace, 244 N.C.
698, 94 S.E.2d 819 (1956); Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 44 S.E.2d 31 (1947);
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Lawing, 225 N.C. 103, 33 S.E.2d 609 (1945); White v.
Holding, 217 N.C. 329, 7 S.E.2d 825 (1940) ; In re Tenhoopen's Custody, 202 N.C.
223, 162 S.E. 619 (1932); State v. Jones, 201 N.C. 424, 160 S.E. 468 (1931);
Thayer v. Thayer, 189 N.C. 502, 127 S.E. 553 (1925) ; State v. Bell, 184 N.C.
701, 115 S.E. 190 (1922) ; Burton v. Belvin, 142 N.C. 151, 55 S.E. 71 (1906) ; 39
Am. Jua. Parent and Child § 35 (1942) ; 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 15 (1950).
" Buchanan v. Buchanan, 170 Va. 458, 197 S.E. 426 (1938).
70 Ibid.
Geary v. Geary, 102 Neb. 511, 167 N.W. 778 (1918)." Willits v. Willits, 76 Neb. 228, 107 N.W. 379 (1906).
"' Barrett v. Barrett, 44 Ariz. 509, 39 P2d 621 (1934) ; Wells v. Wells, 227
N.C. 614, 44 S.E.2d 31 (1947). See other North Carolina cases cited note 76
sup ra.
" 4 VERNiER, op. cit. supra note 65, § 234. The majority of these statutes are
family responsibility laws resigned to prevent persons who are unable to provide
for themselves from becoming public charges.
834 VERNIER, op. cit. supra note 65, § 234.
,See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAr. §§ 14-324, -325 (1953).
'Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 44 S.E.2d 31 (1947). "We do not understand
that a married woman is under the same legal obligation to provide for her chil-
dren as the husband to his wife and children-the husband is under compulsion of
law to support the wife and children. . . " Wise v. Raynor, 200 N.C. 567, 573,
157 S.E. 853, 856 (1931). (Emphasis added.)"' Welch v. Welch, 261 App. Div. 271, 25 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1941).
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it is generally the rule that the mother is liable upon the death of the
father.8 7 Here again statutes in a number of jurisdictions have made
the mother secondarily or equally liable for the support and maintenance
of her minor children. As between the state and the mother, the mother
is primarily responsible for supporting her children. 8
Generally, a person who stands in loco parentis to a child has the
same rights and is subject to the same duties with respect to the child
as a natural parent. Therefore, while that relation continues, he is
bound for the maintenance, care, and education of the child to the same
extent as a natural parent.8 9 Legal adoption was unknown at common
law; and it was not until as late as 1926 that England enacted an adop-
tion statute.90 All American jurisdictions have statutes permitting the
adoption by one person of the off-spring of another.91 Generally, in the
absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, the rights, duties, and
obligations arising from the artificial parent-child relationship created by
adoption are substantially the same as those arising from the natural
parent-child relationship. Therefore, it follows that an adoptive parent is
under the same duty to support his adopted child as any other parent.
Few cases arise, of course, involving the question of the duty to support
an adopted child. This is natural in view of the fact that adoption is
a voluntary procedure, that persons who adopt a child usually want the
child and decide to adopt a child only after they become financially able
to do so, and that the courts in adoption proceedings9 2 only approve
adoptions by families financially able to care for a child and provide for
its welfare.
While the chief ground of the parents' liability for the support of their
children is widely acknowledged to be parentage, nevertheless, illegiti-
mate children do not stand on the same footing as legitimate children
with respect to support and maintenance. At common law the relation-
ship between an illegitimate child and his parent simply did not give rise
"The law in this state imposes a duty on both parents to provide,.within
their means, for the necessary support of their minor children. This is primarily
an obligation of the father. .. .The fact that the father, during life, is primarily
responsible for the support, maintenance, and education of his minor children does
not relieve the mother of her responsibility. Upon the death of the father, a
duty rests on the mother to the best of her ability to provide for the support of
her children. This we conceive to be the common law adopted in North Carolina."
Lee v. Coffield, 245 N.C. 570, 572, 96 S.E.2d 726, 728 (1957).
8 Benedict v. Benedict, 200 Misc. 286, 115 N.Y.S.2d 352 (Dona. Rel. Ct. 1952).
"Waldrup v. Crane, 203 Ga. 388, 46 S.E.2d 919 (1948). It is practically the
universal rule that a stepfather who places himself in loco parentis to his wife's
child by taking the child into his home under his care assumes the obligation to
support the child and acquires a correlative right to the child's services. MADDEN,
op. cit. supra note 72, §§ 110-11; see also Hussey v. Roundtree, 44 N.C. 110 (1852).
'o The Adoption of Children Act, 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 29.
1 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 48-1 to -35 (1950), as amended, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 48-2 to -29 (Supp. 1959).
" In North Carolina adoption of a child is accomplished through a special
proceeding before the clerk of the Superior Court. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-12 (1950).
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to the same rights and duties as that between a legitimate child and his
parent.93  In the absence of statut an illegitimate child is regarded as
nullius filius,94 and his parent is under no legal obligation to support
him.95 Moreover, statutes imposing upon parents and others the duty of
supporting minor children, and which do not specifically refer to ille-
gitimate children, have been generally construed to apply only to legiti-
mate children.9 6
On the other hand, the father of an illegitimate child, who is scarcely
recognized as such for any purpose at common law, may be held liable
on an express promise to pay for the support of his child,97 or on an
implied promise where he has adopted the child as his own and has
acquiesced in the disposition of it.9s And further, it has been held that
the mother of an illegitimate child is legally bound to support it even in
the absence of statute.99
Almost all states now have civil or criminal statutes which in some
way impose on the father or mother, or both, the duty to support an
illegitimate child.'0 0 Some of these statutes are of the "poor law" type
requiring the support of indigent relatives ;1O1 others are criminal statutes
penalizing abandonment and nonsupport of children, including illegiti-
mate children ;102 still others are of the type known as "bastardy laws,"
providing for a determination of paternity and the enforcement of a duty
"' MADDEN, op. cit. supra note 72, § 105. It has been said that neither parent of
an illegitimate child owed it any duty of support at common law. Murrell v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 291 Ili. 334, 126 N.E. 189 (1920). However, some courts have held
that the mother had a duty to maintain such a child at common law. In re
Vieweger, 93 N.J. Eq. 291, 117 Atl. 291 (Ch. 1922).
" Todd v. Weber, 95 N.Y. 181 (1884); Allen v. Hunnicutt, 230 N.C. 49, 52
S.E.2d 18 (1949).
" See Annot., 30 A.L.R. 1069 (1924). But see Sanders v. Sanders, 167 N.C.
319, 83 S.E. 490, 491 (1914), where the court said: "There can be no controversy
that the father is under a legal as well as moral duty to support his infant children,
... and if he has the ability to do so, whether they have property or not....
There is a natural obligation to support even illegitimate children which the law
not only recognizes, but enforces. Burton v. Belvin, 142 N.C. 153 .... Besides,
the failure to support his children is a crime." See also Burton v. Belvin, 142
N.C. 151, 55 S.E. 71 (1906) ; Kimbrough v. Davis, 16 N.C. 71 (1827).
Beaver v. State, 96 Tex. Crim. 179, 256 S.W. 929 (1923).
A promise by the reputed father of an unborn child conceived out of wedlock
to the mother, to support and educate the child, is not contrary to law or founded
on an immoral consideration, and it may be enforced in an action by the child on
a third party beneficiary theory. Conley v. Cabe, 198 N.C. 298, 151 S.E. 645
(1930); Redmon v. Roberts, 198 N.C. 161, 150 S.E. 881 (1929); Thayer v.
Thayer, 189 N.C. 502, 127 N.C. 553 (1925). And a contract to provide for an
illegitimate child given upon condition that bastardy proceedings against the re-
puted father and obligor in the contract shall be commenced, or shall be discon-
tinued, is not void as a contract to compound a criminal offense. Burton v. Belvin,
142 N.C. 151, 55 S.E. 71 (1906).
" Burton v. Belvin, supra note 97.
"'In re Vieweger, 93 N.J. Eq. 527, 117 Atl. 291 (Ch. 1922); Friesner v.
Symonds, 46 N.J. Eq. 521, 20 Atl. 257 (Prerogative Ct. 1890).
100 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 18 (1938); see also Note, 28 N.C.L. REv. 119, 121
(194.
1 See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 252.3 (1949) ; N.D. REv. CODE § 32-3601 (1943).
1024 VERImR, op. cit. supra note 65, § 234.
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of support against the person found to be the father of the child.' 08 The
use of criminal sanctions to compel the parents of illegitimate children to
support them will be considered in a later portion of this article.
The fact that a minor child has independent means and an estate of
its own ordinarily will not relieve a parent of his obligation to support
the child.104 However, the parental obligation of support is not unquali-
fied. A parent is expected to support his child to the extent of his ability
to do so; and as a practical matter the courts, in determining the
parent's ability, consider his means, his health, and his station in life.
In Maryland Cas. Co. v. Lawing'0 5 a widowed mother, the natural and
de facto guardian of the minor children, made disbursements in good
faith from the estate prior to her appointment as legal guardian. Hold-
ing that the disbursements would not be disallowed, the court said:
"While it is the primary duty of a parent to support his child whether
the child has an estate or not this obligation may be qualified by the
parent's ability .... And when the parent has not means sufficient to
provide necessary maintenance he should have reasonable allowance for
lawful disbursements from the child's estate for that purpose."'10
When a parent is unable to support his child and the child has prop-
erty of its own, equity will make allowances to the parent from the
child's estate for its past or future maintenance. However, it is well
settled that equity will grant such allowances only when the parent is
incapable of furnishing adequate support, the child's fortune exceeds that
of its parents, and it would be for the benefit of the child to order such
allowances to be made from its estate.10 7
As a general rule the common law duty of the parent to support his
child terminates when the child reaches his majority (arbitrarily set at
twenty-one years of age), 0 8 or upon the child's complete emancipation
prior to maturity.10 However, there is a well recognized exception to
So. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 49-2 to -13 (1950), as amended, N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 49-2 to -13 (Supp. 1959) ; see also Note, 28 N.C.L. REv. 119, 121 (1949).
10" "The North Carolina court early recognized as a legal duty on the father to
maintain his children, even when they had separate estates of their own. Walker v.
Crowder, 37 N.C. 478 (1843)." Note, 26 N.C.L. Ray. 202 (1948), n. 3; see also
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Lawing, 225 N.C. 104, 33 S.E.2d 609 (1945); 67 C.J.S.
Parent and Child § 15 (1950).
105 225 N.C. 103, 33 S.E.2d 609 (1945). 'o' Id. at 107, 33 S.E.2d at 612.
... The property of minors can only be used for their support when the parents
are unable to provide properly such support. Lee v. Coffield, 245 N.C. 570, 96
S.E.2d 726 (1957); see also Annot., 121 A.L.R. 176 (1939).
.. Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340 (1903) ; Humboldt County v. Biegger, 232
Iowa 494, 4 N.E.2d 422 (1942); Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 44 S.E.2d 31
(1947). The North Carolina statutes imposing criminal liability for abandonment,
neglect, and nonsupport of children all set maximum ages at less than twenty-one
years: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-322 (Supp. 1959) (eighteen years) ; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-326 (1953) (sixteen years); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-2 (Supp. 1959) (eighteen
years).
.. James v. James, 226 N.C. 399, 38 S.E.2d 168 (1946); Holland v. Hartley,
171 N.C. 376, 88 S.E. 507 (1916) ; Lowrie v. Oxendine, 153 N.C. 267, 69 S.E. 131
(1910).
[Vol. 88
1959] THE PROBLEM OF FAMILY SUPPORT 17
1
the general rule. Where a child is physically or mentally defective, is
unable to support himself after coming of age, and remains unmarried
and in the parental home, the parent's obligation to support him con-
tinues until the necessity for support ceases. 110 In Wells v. Wells,"'
a case of first impression in North Carolina, the mother of an adult child
brought an action against the father (the parents were separated) to
recover the value of necessaries furnished and services rendered to their
adult son. She alleged that the defendant had separated himself from
his family, that the son continued to live with the plaintiff, his mother,
before and after reaching his majority, and that before and after majority
the son was insolvent, unmarried, and so physically and mentally handi-
capped as to be incapable of supporting himself. The North Carolina
Supreme Court, reversing the judgment below, held that the complaint
stated a good cause of action."
2
That the death of the parent also terminates the parent's liability for
the support of the child at common law" 3 is clear; but the rule is severely
criticized and some courts have refused to follow it, especially in cases
involving court decrees for support, separation agreements, and other
contracts. 114 The question of whether a parent's duty to support his
child is terminated by the death of the parent was presented to the North
11 Zakroki v. Zakrold, 115 Ind. App. 556, 60 N.E.2d 745 (1945); Breuer v.
Dowden, 207 Ky. 12, 268 S.W. 541 (1925); Crain v. Mallone, 130 Ky. 125, 113
S.W. 67 (1908); Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 44 S.E.2d 31 (1947); Schultz v.
Western Farm Tractor Co., 111 Wash. 351, 190 Pac. 1007 (1920). Some cases
in imposing liability on a parent for an incapacitated adult child make a qualifica-
tion that the child for whom support is sought after majority must have been
incapacitated at the time of reaching majority. See, e.g., Breuer v. Dowden, mtpra;
Crain v. Mallone, supra. Contra, In re Van Denburgh, 178 App. Div. 237, 164
N.Y. Supp. 966 (1917); Alger v. Miller, 56 Barb. (N.Y.) 227 (1868); Crom-
well v. Benjamin, 41 Barb. (N.Y.) 558 (1863).227 N.C. 614, 44 S.E.2d 31 (1947).
"In the light of the public policy of this State, and in keeping with the dic-
tates of humanity, the principles of law enunciated in these authorities [cases
holding parents liable for support of incapacitated adult child] are persuasive and
convincing. Hence, we hold that ordinarily the law presumes that when a child
reaches the age of twenty-one years he will be capable of maintaining himself, and
in such case the obligation of the father to provide support terminates. But where
this presumption is rebutted by the fact of mental or physical incapacity, it no
longer obtains, and the obligation of the father continues." Id. at 619-20, 44 S.E.2d
at 35.
11I Blades v. Szatai, 151 Md. 644, 135 Atl. 841 (1927) ; Rice v. Andrews, 127
Misc. 826, 217 N.Y. Supp. 528 (Sup. Ct. 1926) ; Silberman v. Brown, 34 Ohio Op.
295, 72 N.E.2d 267 (1946) ; Robinson v. Robinson, 131 W. Va. 160, 50 S.E.2d 455
(1948), 62 HARV. L. REv. 1079 (1949) ; MADDEN, op. cit. supra note 72, § 115.
""it re Van Arsdale's Will, 190 Misc. 968, 75 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Surr. Ct. 1947)
(contract for support, independent of divorce decree, survived father's death);
Stone v. Bagley, 75 Wash. 184, 130 Pac. 820 (1913) (property settlement providing
for support of minor children survived father's death) ; Edelman v. Edelman, 65
Wyo. 271, 203 P.2d (1949) (divorce decree based on agreement survived the
father's death). In the Bagley case, supra, the Washington court questioned the
common law .rule as a matter of public policy, and other courts have felt that the
justice of the case calls strongly for a holding that the obligation for support con-
tinues after the father's death. See, e.g., In re Smith's Estate, 200 Cal. 654,-254 Pac.
567 (1927) ; see also Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 1126 (1951).
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Carolina Supreme Court for the first time in 1952 in the case of Elliott
v. Elliott." 5 In that case the father had been married twice and was
living with his second wife and their children at the time of his death.
He left a will devising the bulk of his real property to the six adult
children of his first marriage and bequeathing only ten dollars to the six
children, including one en ventre sa inere, of his second marriage,
although his personal estate was worth almost six thousand dollars. The
minor children of his second marriage brought an action against the
executor of their father's estate to recover such sums as would be rea-
sonable for their support until they reached their majority. The court, in
affirming the judgment below sustaining the defendant's demurrer, held,
in substance, that the common law obligation of a father to support his
minor children is not a property right but a personal duty which is
terminated by the death of the father and cannot be made the basis of
a claim against the estate of the father who has disposed of his property
by will without providing for the support of his minor children. In
view of the fact that North Carolina has no statute on this point and the
common law is in effect," 6 perhaps no other result could have been
reached by the court. However, the problem posed by the Elliott case
clearly seems to be one in which a sense of justice demands a different,
more equitable rule.
The divorce a mensa, et thoro or a vinculo of a child's parents does
not, by the weight of authority, terminate the father's duty to support
or contribute to the support of the child; and the fact that custody was
awarded to the mother does not change the rule." 7 A divorce decree
does not ipso facto terminate or diminish the father's liability for the
support of his child. On the contrary, it usually makes provisions for
the support of children of the marriage. His obligation continues and
may be enforced by his former wife or the child." 8 It has also been held
that the father's duty is not terminated by the fact that the child does
not live in the parental home, if separation is the result of the parents'
consent or of their wrongful conduct in driving him from the home by
. 235 N.C. 153, 69 S.E.2d 224 (1952), 30 N.C.L. Rsv. 417 (1952).
.. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (1953)."' "The liability of the father primarily to support the children remains as well
after as before divorce, and even when the custody of the children has been awarded
to the mother." Green v. Green, 210 N.C. 147, 149, 185 S.E. 651, 652 (1936).
Accord, Pickelsimer v. Critcher, 210 N.C. 779, 188 S.E. 313 (1936) ; Sanders v.
Sanders, 167 N.C. 319, 83 S.E. 490 (1914). When the wife institutes a suit for
divorce, either absolute or from bed and board, she may compel the husband to
provide support for any minor child of the marriage by a motion in the cause,
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13, which may be filed before or after final judgment.
A wife may also obtain support for herself and the children of the marriage in a
proceeding for alimony without divorce under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16. A discussion
of the problem of child support as it arises in actions for divorce and alimony is
beyond the scope of this article.
118 Green v. Green, supra note 117; Pickelsimer v. Critcher, supra note 117.
[Vol. 38
THE PROBLEM OF FAMILY SUPPORT
abuse and maltreatment. 119 Finally, there is the practical problem of
enforcing the duty of parents to provide support for their minor children.
While there is a sharp split in the authorities on the question of the
child's right to sue its parent for support, it has more frequently been
held that, in the absence of statute, a direct action against the father for
support may not be maintained by the child or his mother in law or in
equity.1 20  The rationale of this rule is said to be that as a matter of
public policy actions which tend to destroy family harmony and disci-
pline and promote domestic discord should not be permitted. But quaere
as to whether there is any family harmony to be preserved when the
normal parental desire to nurture and care for a child has deteriorated to
such an extent that the child must resort to legal proceedings to compel
the parent to provide for his maintenance. The conception of the com-
mon law seems to have been that the parental duty of support could be
enforced indirectly by permitting third parties to sue the parent for the
value of necessaries furnished to the child.12 1 This method of compelling
support, inadequate though it may be, is available in all jurisdictions;
so ordinarily a third person 122 may recover from the father for neces-
saries furnished to a minor child under proper circumstances. 23  The
ineffectiveness of this method 124 of enforcing liability has led many
courts to permit the child, under varying circumstances, to maintain an
action directly against the parent to compel him to support the child. 1 25
Some of these courts have taken the position that the right in the child
to support is correlative to the duty of the parent to furnish it, and the
enforcement of the obligation should not be left to the indirect method
of an action by a creditor against the parent for necessaries furnished the
"10 P. J. Hunycutt & Co. v. Thompson, 159 N.C. 29, 74 S.E.2d 628 (1912).
11°Bedrick v. Bedrick, 151 Misc. 4, 270 N.Y. Supp. 566 (Sup. Ct. 1933), affd,
241 App. Div. 807, 271 N.Y. Supp. 949 (1934) ; MADDEN, op. cit. supra note 72,
§ 112; 67 C.J.S. Parent mzd Child § 20 (1950); see generally Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d
1142 (1950).
"'MADDEN, op. cit. supra note 72, §§ 111-12.
1' The mother has the same right as other relatives and strangers to recover
from the father for necessaries furnished to the child, in the absence of any equi-
table reason for imposing on her the father's primary obligation to support the
child. 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 16 (1950).
"23 Blue Ridge Park Nurseries v. Owen, 41 Ga. App. 98, 152 S.E. 485 (1930);
State v. Walker, 246 Iowa 932, 70 N.W.2d 177 (1955); Glaze v. Hart, 225 Mo.
App. 1205, 36 S.W2d 684 (1931) ; O'Brien v. Springer, 202 Misc. 210, 107 N.Y.S.
2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Saracco v. Corelli, 268 App. Div. 34, 48 N.Y.S.2d 434
(1944); Cole v. Wagner, 197 N.C. 692, 150 S.E. 339 (1929) (dictum).
124 To a great extent its effectiveness depends upon the willingness of relatives,
merchants and other strangers to supply the child with goods and services under
admittedly discouraging conditions, one of the discouraging conditions being the
almost certain refusal of the father to pay out anything until compelled to do so
by legal action.
12" Simonds v. Simonds, 154 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1946) ; Upchurch v. Upchurch,
196 Ark. 324, 117 S.W.2d 339 (1938) ; Paxton v. Paxton, 150 Colo. 667, 89 Pac.
1083 (1907) ; Bryant v. Bryant, 212 N.C. 6, 192 S.E. 864 (1937) ; Pickelsimer v.
Critcher, 210 N.C. 779, 188 S.E. 313 (1936) ; Green v. Green, 210 N.C. 147, 185
S.E. 651 (1936) ; Campbell v. Campbell, 200 S.C. 67, 20 S.E.2d 237 (1942).
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child, but the child should be permitted to enforce the obligation in a
direct action against the parent. North Carolina is one of the states
which, under varying circumstances, allows a direct action by the child
against the parent. In Green v. Green 26 the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that a six-year-old infant, appearing by her next friend, could
maintain an action against the father for support and maintenance, not-
withstanding the fact that the bonds of matrimony between the parents
had been dissolved. In fact, the dissolution of the family relationship by
divorce served as the basis for distinguishing this case from others in
which the child was not permitted to sue its parents directly for support
on the ground that to permit such a suit would destroy family harmony
and be detrimental to the integrity of the home. Here, as the court
pointed out,'2 7 there was no family harmony to be endangered by the
child's suit against its father. The home had already been disrupted by
divorce, abandonment, and nonsupport.
While the cases in which the North Carolina court has permitted the
child to sue its parent for support have involved actions by the child of
divorced parents,'2 8 nevertheless, it is submitted that a direct action by
the child as the most effective means of enforcing the parent's obligation
should be permitted in all cases. When the necessity for legal action to
compel a parent to support its child arises, family life has already de-
teriorated to such an extent that there is apparently no harmony to
preserve, even though the family ties have not yet been legally dissolved
by a formal divorce.
There have been intimations in several North Carolina cases that an
illegitimate child would also be permitted to enforce its now generally
recognized right to receive support and maintenance from its putative
father. 29 However, in an action based solely upon the alleged relation-
126 210 N.C. 147, 185 S.E. 651 (1936).
"It was held in Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, that an unemancipated
child could not sue the father for a tort (there the alleged negligent operation of
an automobile). Recovery was denied in that case upon the sound principle of the
necessity of preserving the peace and privacy of the home and maintaining harmony
in the domestic relations and family life. The ground upon which the right of action
for tort by a child against a parent has been generally denied has been that, the
family being the social unit, such actions would tend to undermine the influence of
the home and were inconsistent with the family relation while it existed .... But,
as pointed out in . . . Small v. Morrison . . . a distinction is made where the
family relation had already been dissolved or disturbed and its harmony rudely
shattered by the action of the father .... Here it is alleged that defendant had
obtained a divorce from plaintiff's mother, had abandoned the plaintiff to the pre-
carious support of charity, and denied her paternity. There was no family life to
be preserved." Green v. Green, 210 N.C. 147, 149, 185 S.E. 651, 652 (1936), 15
N.C.L. Rnv. 67 (1936).
2' Thomas v. Thomas, 248 N.C. 269, 103 S.E.2d 371 (1958); Mahan v. Read,
240 N.C. 641, 83 S.E.2d 706 (1954) ;-Bryant v. Bryant, 212 N.C. 6, 192 S.E. 864
(1937); Pickelsimer v. Critcher, 210 N.C. 779, 188 S.E. 313 (1936); Green v.
Green, 210 N.C. 147, 185 S.E. 651 (1936);
2I Pickelsimer v. Critcher, supra note 128; Green v. Green, supra note 128;
Conley v. Cabe, 198 N.C. 298, 151 S.E. 645 (1930); Redman v. Roberts, 198 N.C.
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ship and presenting directly the question of whether an illegitimate child
may maintain a civil action to establish its paternity and compel its
putative father to furnish it support, the court answered in the negative,
holding that an illegitimate child may not maintain a civil action against
its father to compel the father to provide for its support.13 0 "Such
rights as it may have,"' 31 said the court, can only be enforced in accord-
ance with the procedure set out in the statutes, which provide an exclu-
sive remedy for the enforcement of the right of an illegitimate child to
support by his putative father. Unfortunately, the only means available
to the illegitimate child for enforcing its statutory rights is an indirect
one-namely, a criminal prosecution, which apparently may be instituted
only by the child's mother or her personal representative or the superin-
tendent of public welfare. 13 2  Furthermore, since the only remedy the
illegitimate child has is under the bastardy statute and since the time
limitations for bringing an action under that statute are rather strict, 133
the illegitimate child may find himself without any remedy at all.
In addition to the remedies of an indirect action by third parties to
recover for necessaries furnished the child and the direct civil action by
the child against the parent (permitted under limited circumstances),
the other remedies available to the legitimate child to compel his parent
to support him are a civil action brought by the mother,13 4 a motion in
the cause made by the mother in a divorce proceeding,13 5 criminal prose-
cution of the offending parent for abandonment, neglect, and nonsup-
port,13 6 and the remedies available under the Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support Act.13 7 The provisions of the Uniform Act and the
use of criminal sanctions to compel a parent to support his child will be
discussed further in this article.
161, 150 S.E. 881 (1929) ; Hyatt v. McCoy, 195 N.C. 762, 143 S.E. 518 (1928);
Thayer v. Thayer, 189 N.C. 502, 127 S.E. 553 (1925); Sanders v. Sanders, 167
N.C. 319, 83 S.E. 490 (1914) ; Burton v. Belvin, 142 N.C. 150, 55 S.E. 71 (1906);
Kimborough v. Davis, 16 N.C. 71 (1827).
1' Allen v. Hunnicutt, 230 N.C. 49, 52 S.E.2d 18 (1949).
11 The only rights an illegitimate child has, relative to its support are those
created by the statutes, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 49-1 to -13 (1950), as amended, N.C.
Gen. Stat. §§ 49-2 to -13 (Supp. 1959), and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7-103 (Supp. 1959),
and those based on contract. As to its right to sue on a contract made for its
benefit see cases cited note 129 supra.
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-5 (1950). Whether the illegitimate child may institute
the criminal prosecution has not yet been determined by the North Carolina court.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-4 (Supp. 1959) ; State v. Robinson, 245 N.C. 10, 95
S.E.2d 126 (1956); Note, 26 N.C.L. Rsv. 305 (1948); Note, 28 N.C.L. REy. 119
(1949).
" Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 44 S.E.2d 31 (1947), 26 N.C.L. REV. 202
(1948) ; see also note 122 supra.
"I N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13 (Supp. 1959) ; Winfield v. Winfield, 228 N.C. 256,
45 S.E.2d 259 (1947).
"3'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-322 to -326 (1950), as amended, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 14-322 to -326.1 (Supp. 1959).1 7 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52A-1 to -20 (Supp. 1959).
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IV
CHILD'S DUTY To SUPPORT PARENT
At common law an adult child is under no legal obligation to support
his parents, regardless of the fact that they are old, incapacitated, or
destitute.138 A fortiori, a minor child is under no duty to support his
parents even though he has an estate in his own right and a personal for-
tune that far exceeds that of his parents.139 Although the parent is en-
titled to any wages earned by an unemancipated child during its mi-
nority,140 this right of the parent is everywhere regarded as correlative
to the duty of the parent to support the child, not as arising out of any
duty on the part of the child to provide for its parents.1' 1
An adult child may assume by express contract an obligation to
support his parents142 or to pay for necessaries furnished to them
by third parties ;143 and under some circumstances he may be liable on
an implied contract to support them. For example, if one child provides
care and maintenance for his parents at the request of his brothers and
sisters, he may recover from them their share of the expense on their
implied promise to pay for the parents' support.144
The common law rules have been modified or abrogated entirely by
statutes, civil and criminal, in many jurisdictions. In fact, most states
have enacted laws requiring persons in various degrees of kinship to
.38 Duffy v. Yordi, 149 Colo. 140, 84 Pac. 838 (1906) ; Wood v. Wheat, 226 Ky.
762, 11 S.W.2d 916 (1928); Thornsberry v. State Dept. of Pub. Health & Wel-
fare, 365 Mo. 1217, 295 S.W.2d 372 (1956) (moral rather than legal obligation) ;
Howlett v. Social Security Comm'n, 347 Mo. 784, 149 S.W.2d 806 (1941) ; Couteau
v. Couteau, 192 Misc. 736, 77 N.Y.S.2d 113 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1948); 39 Am. JUR.
Parent and Child § 70 (1942) ; 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 24 (1950) ; MADDEN,
PERSONS AND DOmESTIC RELATIONS § 141 (1931).
... As has been seen above equity will sometimes make allowances to a parent
from the child's estate. See note 107 supra and accompanying text. However,
this is done only in exceptional cases where the parent is unable to support his child
or where the child's personal fortune warrants expenditures for its maintenance and
education on a scale beyond that possible on the parent's meager resources. Lee v.
Coffield, 245 N.C. 570, 96 S.E.2d 726 (1957). It will be noted, however, that such
an allowance is for the support of the child, not the parent. There are a few early
English cases in which the Court of Chancery allowed maintenance to the parent
from the child's estate. Roach v. Garvan, 1 Ves. Sen. 157, 27 Eng. Rep. 954
(Ch. 1748) ; Heysham v. Heysham, 1 Cox 179, 29 Eng. Rep. 1117 (Ch. 1785). See
also it re Connolly's Estate, 88 Misc. 405, 150 N.Y. Supp. 559 (Surr. Ct. 1914),
where the New York court, relying on precedents in equity, held, in the absence of
a statute covering the point, that the estate of an infant could be charged by its
general guardian with the burial expenses of the infant's mother, on the ground
that equity would enforce the moral duty of a child to support or bury its parent.
...White v. Holding, 217 N.C. 329, 332, 7 S.E.2d 825, 827 (1940); Daniel v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R, 171 N.C. 23, 86 S.E. 174 (1915).
..1 Ulrich v. Ulrich, 136 N.Y. 120, 32 N.E. 606 (1892).
2 Ibid.
148 See Note, 117 Am. St. Rep. 128 (1908) ; Note, 9 Ann. Cas. 1019 (1908). No
promise to pay for necessaries furnished to the parents will be implied from a mere
showing of the parent-child relationship. MADDEN, op. cit. supra note 138, § 141.
"Wyman v. Passmore, 146 Iowa 186, 125 N.W. 213 (1910).
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support their indigent relatives. 145 These enactments, known as family
responsibility laws, are designed to relieve the taxpayers from the burden
of supporting poor persons who have relatives financially able to care for
them; some of them have criminal as well as civil sanctions for their
enforcement.' 4 6 Such statutes are frequently treated as part of the "poor
laws" of the state, strengthening family responsibility for those persons
in need of general assistance. 14 7 This type of legislation is not entirely
a modern development, nor a reaction to the concept of the welfare state.
The precursors of American family responsibility laws were the "poor
laws of England, especially the Elizabethan Poor Law,148 which imposed
a duty of maintaining a needy person upon his parents, children, and
grandparents. The range of relatives covered by the American statutes
varies from state to state. The obligation to support needy relatives has
been extended beyond those persons who had duties of support at com-
mon law. Some of the statutes have added grandchildren, brothers and
sisters, and husbands and wives to the parents, children, and grandparents
of the original Elizabethan statutes. 
1 4
9
145 E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 206; CAL. WELFARE & IxsT. CODE § 2576; GA. CODEANN. § 23-2302 (1936) ; N.Y. CIM~. CODE § 914; N.Y.C. Dom. REL. CT. AcT §§ 92,
101; N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW § 101; S.C. CODE § 71-131 (1952)."' Cal Civ. Code § 206 provides: "It is the duty of the father, the mother, and
the children of any poor person who is unable to maintain himself by work, to main-
tain such person to the extent of their ability. The promise of an adult child to
pay for necessaries previously furnished to such parent is binding." Cal. Pen. Code
§ 270(c) provides: "[E]very adult child who, having the ability to do so, fails to
provide necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical attendance for an indigent
parent, is guilty of a misdemeanor." For a comprehensive and exhaustive study of
this type of legislation, see Mandelker, Family Responsibility Under the American
Poor Laws, 54 MIcH. L. -Ev. (pts. 1, 2) 497, 607 (1956).
""' The legislative programs, federal and state, providing public aid to those in
need have come to be known in the social welfare field as "public assistance." There
are two types of public assistance: (1) general assistance, aid to needy persons
generally, and (2) special or categorical assistance, aid to particular classes of
needy persons, namely, dependent children, the blind, the aged and the permanently
and totally disabled.
148 The Elizabethan Poor Law, 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 2. The statute of 1601, which
became widely known as the Elizabethan Poor Law, was actually a re-enactment,
with some modifications, of a 1597-98 codification of English poor relief laws. The
1601 statute provided, in part, as follows: "VII. And be it further enacted, That
the father and grandfather, and the mother and grandmother, and the children of
every poor, old, blind, lame and impotent person, or other poor persons not able to
work, being of a sufficient ability, shall, at their own charges, relieve and maintain
every such poor persons in that manner, and according to that rate, as by the justices
of the peace of that county where such sufficient persons dwell, or the greater num-
ber of them, at their general quarter-sessions shall be assessed . . .!
14' Originally, husbands and wives were not included in the Elizabethan Poor
Law of 1601. Later acts remedied the omission. Poor Law Amendment, 1868, 31
& 32 Vict. c. 122, § 33; Married Women's Property Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75,
§ 20. It is interesting to note that Blackstone considered the poor laws as merely
declaratory of general principles of law, but Kent regarded the primary purpose of
the legislation as that of protecting the public purse. Compare 1 BLAcKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND *448 with 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 191 (12th ed. 1873).
For an example of an American statute of this type, see NEB. REv. STAT. § 68-
102 (Reissue 1958), which provides: "The children shall first be called upon to
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The family responsibility laws have not been used so much to enforce
the support duties that were recognized at common law and that are
now incorporated into statutory law in most jurisdictions; but they have
been used primarily to compel adult children to support their needy
parents, and to compel some collateral relatives, such as brothers and
sisters, to support each other. The statutory extensions of support duties
seem to be based on the theory that as between the state and members of
the family of a needy person the members of his family should be pri-
marily responsible for his care and maintenance if they have sufficient
means to provide for him. Whether it is socially desirable to compel, by
court process, persons to maintain their indigent relatives (particularly
collateral relatives) who are not a part of the usual interdependent
family unit is open to serious question.
North Carolina is one of the few remaining states50 without family
responsibility laws. However, North Carolina passed an act' 5 ' in 1955
requiring children to support their needy parents under penalty of crimi-
nal prosecution for failure to do so and providing for contribution among
the several children of the same parent. Thus the common law rule has
been changed by statute in North Carolina: an adult child is now re-
quired to support his needy parent.
V
ABANDONMENT, DESERTION, NEGLECT AND NONSUPPORT
As COMMON LAW CRIMINAL OFFENSES
Most authorities agree that abandonment, desertion, neglect and non-
support, as such, are not crimes at common law. 5 2 However, there is
support parents, if there be children of sufficient ability; and if there be none of
sufficient ability, the parents of such persons shall next be called upon; and if
there be no parents nor children, the brothers and sisters shall be next called upon;
and if there be no brothers nor sisters, the grandchildren of such poor person shall
next be called upon, and then the grandparents; Provided, married females, while
they live with their husbands, shall not be liable to a suit for maintenance beyond
the interest or income of the estate of such married female in her own right." See
also N.Y. Soc. WEL.FAm LAW § 101; N.Y.C. Dom. REL. CT. ACT. §§ 92, 101.
"0 Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, New Mexico, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
Washington, and Wyoming.
I" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-326.1 (1953), provides: "If any person being of full
age, and having sufficient income after reasonably providing for his or her own
immediate family shall, without reasonable cause, neglect to maintain and support
his or her parents, if such parent or parents be sick or not able to work and have
not sufficient means or ability to maintain or support themselves, such person shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, shall be fined or im-
prisoned in the discretion of the court. If there be more than one person bound
under ... these provisions ... to support the same parent or parents, they shall
share equitably in the discharge of such duty."
"'Abandonment is a willful leaving of a child by its parent, or one spouse by
another, with an intention to cause a perpetual separation. In re Kronjaeger, 166
Ohio St 172, 140 N.E.2d 773 (1957). Td constitute abandonment there must
be an actual desertion, accompanied by an intention to sever, so far as it is possible
to do so, the parental or marital relation and throw off all obligations growing out
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some authority to the contrary on the point, constituted for the most
part of dicta in a few cases. For example, in an old Nebraska case,' 53
where a wife brought suit in equity for maintenance and support without
a prayer for divorce a mensa et thoro or a vinculo, the court overruled a
demurrer to the complaint and said in passing that "at common law,
where the husband heedlessly and wantonly, and from improper motives,
refused a wife the necessary comforts of life and refused to provide for
her, a criminal prosecution, with recognizance, was sometimes resorted
to, for the purpose of compelling a competent husband to support his
family."' 54 The only authority cited by the court to support this propo-
sition was Schouler. 55
Under some circumstances the neglect of a parent to provide for
of the relation, and it is not committed under circumstances of coercion. In re
Jones, 131 Cal. App. 2d 831, 281 P.2d 310 (1955). Willfully forsaking and desert-
ing the duties of parenthood, and leaving a minor child in a dependent condition,
constitute essential elements of the offense of abandonment of a minor child. Cox
v. State, 85 Ga. App. 702, 70 S.E2d 100 (1952). "Abandonment" is used synony-
mously with "desertion." Abandonment is desertion, an unjustifiable separation
coupled with discontinuance of marital obligation to support, and does not embrace
separation by consent. State v. Carson, 228 N.C. 151, 44 S.E.2d 721 (1947).
Desertion is the willful forsaking of duties. There is desertion when a parent
quits the society of his child and renounces the duties he owes it. State v. Clark,
148 Minn. 389, 182 N.W. 452 (1921). Desertion means a separation from wrong-
fully, without intention of again resuming marital relations. People v. Stickle,
156 Mich. 557, 121 N.W. 497 (1909). Desertion or abandonment of child or spouse
may be actual or constructive. It is constructive when the child or spouse is ex-
cluded from the parental or marital domicile by the parent or other spouse willfully
and without justification. See Danzi v. Danzi, 185 Pa. Super. 111, 137 A.2d 809
(1958).
Neglect is a designed refusal or unwillingness to perform one's duty. It is a
disregard of duty from indifference or willfuliness. It re Masters, 165 Ohio St.
503, 137 N.E.2d 752 (1956). While abandonment and desertion import separation,
quitting absolutely, neglect does not have that connotation. To constitute an aban-
donment of a child, there must be a willful leaving of a child by his parent with an
intention to cause perpetual separation, and to constitute neglect of a child, there
must be a willful or indifferent disregard of the duty owed by a parent to his child.
It re Kronjaeger, 166 Ohio St. 172, 140 N.E.2d 773 (1957).
Nonsupport is the failure to perform the duties, imposed by common law or
statute, to provide for the care and maintenance of the persons to whom the duties
are owed. It is the failure to contribute to the maintenance and material well being
of a child. In re Musczak's Estate, 196 Misc. 364, 92 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Surr. Ct.
1949). It is the failure to provide the necessities for subsistence: food, shelter,
clothing, medical attention, and education, and the ordinary comforts of life.
While at common law there was criminal liability for a negative act (failure to
take action where there was a legal duty imposed by law or contract to take posi-
tive action, sometimes referred to as a "forbearance" if intentional and an "omis-
sion" if unintentional or negligent), nevertheless, the particular negative acts enu-
merated above were not, without more, criminal. Brooke v. State, 99 FIa. 1275, 128
So. 814 (1930) ; Stedman v. State, 80 Fla. 547, 86 So. 428 (1920) ; In re Ryder's
Petition, 4 Edw. Ch. 338. aff'd, 11 Paige (N.Y.) 185 (1844) : State v. Manon, 204
N.C. 52, 167 S.E. 493 (1933); 27 Aif. Jua. Husband and Wife § 435 (1940) ; 39
Air. TUR. Parent and Child .103 (1942): 42 C.J.S. Husband and Wife .630
(1944) ; 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 91 (1950) ; 3 BunRncx, LAW OF CRIF § 851
(1946).
"" Earle v. Earle. 27 Neb. 277, 43 N.W. 118 (1889).
'15 Id. at 278, 43 N.W. at 119.
... SCHOUmE, HuSBAND AND Wr § 66 (6th ed. 1921).
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his infant child of tender years who is incapable of providing for himself
is an indictable misdemeanor where the child is seriously harmed as a
consequence of the neglect.'5 6 In the early English case of Regina v.
Hogan157 a mother was indicted for unlawfully abandoning her bastard
child of tender age without having provided means for its support and
with the unlawful intent of burdening the parish with its care. Pollock,
J., in quashing the conviction, said:
We are all of the opinion that this indictment cannot be sustained.
No doubt, to neglect a child so as to injure its health is an offence
in the person whose duty it is to take care of it; but here there is
no allegation of any injury to the child, nor that the mother had
the means of supporting it. As to the supposed injury to the
parish, we are not disposed to go beyond the authorities, and there
is no authority for saying that any person is indictable who occa-
sions loss to a parish by throw-upon it the maintenance of a child
as casual poor.
15 8
On the other hand, the parent or husband who neglects his duty to
provide food, shelter, clothing and medical attention for a child or wife,
thereby causing the death of the child or wife, is criminally liable for the
homicide at common law, and may be convicted of murder or man-
slaughter, depending upon the circumstances under which the death
occurred. One of the leading cases on this point is Regina v. Conde,"5
where a man and his wife were indicted for the murder of their little son
who died from starvation. The court in summing up the case to the jury,
directed them as follows:
If the prisoners or either of them wilfully withheld necessary food
from the deceased, with a wilful determination by withholding sus-
tenance which was requisite to cause his death, then the party so
withholding such food is guilty of murder. If, however, the pris-
oner had the means to supply the necessaries, the want of which
had led to the death of the deceased, and having the means to
supply such necessaries, negligently, though not wilfully, with-
held food which, if administered, would have sustained life, and
so caused the death of the deceased, then that would amount to
the crime of manslaughter in the person so withholding the
food.'6 0
The mother was found guilty of manslaughter; the father was aquitted.
The rule of law applied in the type of case where death resulted from
the unintentional failure to provide food and other necessities for a child
... Reg. v. Conde, 10 Cox Crim. Cas. 547 (1867) ; Reg. v. Renshaw, 2 Cox Crim.
Cas. 285 (1847). Although the courts recognized that the duty owed by the father
to provide his infant child with food, clothing, and shelter, and to take special care
of him if he became ill, was legal as well as moral, nevertheless, they universally
held that, in the absence of statute, the failure of the father to make such provisions
was not indictable if no serious harm resulted.
SCox Crim. Cas. 255, 169 Eng. Rep. 504 (1851).
Irs Id. at 257-58, 169 Eng. Rep. at 505.
...10 Cox Crim. Cas. 547 (1867). 160 Id. at 549.
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or other helpless person was clearly and explicitly stated in Regina v.
Nicholls'6' as follows:
If a grown person chooses to undertake the charge of a human
creature helpless either from infancy, simplicity, lunacy, or other
infirmity, he is bound to execute that charge without (at all
events) wicked negligence; and if a person who has chosen to
take charge of a helpless creature lets it die by wicked negligence,
that person is guilty of manslaughter. Mere negligence will not
do, there must be wicked negligence, that is, negligence so great,
that you must be of opinion that the prisoner had a wicked
mind, in the sense that she was reckless and careless whether the
creature died or not.'
62
Thus it was well settled at common law that neglect of duty by one under
a legal duty to provide for the care and maintenance of a person in his
charge, particularly a child or wife, resulting in death, rendered him
criminally liable for the homicide, which was manslaughter when the
neglect was due to culpable negligence and murder when the neglect
was willful and intentional; and neglect of duty resulting in harm short
of death was assault when the neglect was due to culpable negligence,
and attempted murder or assault when the neglect was willful and inten-
tional.'8 3 On the other hand, abandonment of and failure to provide
support and maintenance for a child or wife where no harm ensued was
not indictable as a criminal offense.'
64
VI
ABANDONMENT AND NONSUPPORT As STATUTORY OFFENSES: CRIMINAL
SANCTONS FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT
In any event, the question of whether abandonment, desertion, neglect
and nonsupport are crimes at common law is largely academic. Statutes
have been enacted in almost every jurisdiction making it a crime for a
husband or father to abandon and fail to support his wife and children.' 65
"" 13 Cox Crim. Cas. 75 (1874).
...Id. at 76. See also Reg. v. Walters, Car. & Mar. 164, 174 Eng. 455 (1841);
Reg. v. Smith, 10 Cox Crim. Cas. 82, 169 Eng. Rep. 1533 (1865).
.. Reg. v. Conde, 10 Cox Crim. Cas. 547 (1867) ; Pallis v. State, 123 Ala. 12,
26 So. 339 (1899).
52, Floyd v. State, 115 Fla. 625, 155 So. 794 (1934) ; State v. Manon, 204 N.C.
52, 167 S.E. 493 (1933).
"I The nature and elements of the nonsupport offenses vary from state to state.
With respect to the wife, under most of the statutes, the husband may be prosecuted
for abandoning his wife without providing her with adequate support. See, e.g.,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-322 (Supp. 1959). Under other statutes, abandonment or
desertion on the one hand, and nonsupport on the other, may constitute separate,
independent crimes. E.g., in North Carolina the failure of a husband, living with
his wife, to provide adequate support for the wife and children is an offense under
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-325 (1953). With respect to a child under many statutes,
neglect or failure to provide adequate support for the child on one hand, and aban-
donment or desertion of the child on the other, may consitute separate, distinct
offenses. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-322 (Supp. 1959) (neglect or failure to
19591
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Indeed, statutes in many states have extended criminal liability for
abandonment and nonsupport to mothers, children and other persons.
In some states abandonment and nonsupport are felonies ;166 in others,
including North Carolina, they are misdemeanors." 7 The criminal
statutes go beyond the family responsibility statutes and other statutes
for the relief of the poor. They are designed to supplement the civil
remedies which are available to those to whom a duty of support is owed,
to discourage and prevent violation of the duty to support by instilling
fear of prosecution and punishment in those persons who owe a duty,
and to prevent abandoned and unsupported wives and children from
becoming public charges.
The courts unanimously have taken the view that statutes declaring
abandonment and nonsupport of a wife or child to be criminal offenses
are within the police power of the state, and are, therefore, vaild.10 8
The performance by a husband and father of the legal duties which he
voluntarily assumed in contracting marriage is a matter affecting the
general public welfare. In a leading Arkansas case169 upholding the
constitutionality of an abandonment statute, the court said:
It is a little difficult to determine the extent to which the law-
makers may go, for the protection of society at large, in creating
public offenses based upon the conduct of those joined together in
marriage contract; but we entertain no doubt that willful desertion
of the wife by the husband "without good cause" may be made a
criminal offense. Certainly society at large is interested in pre-
venting such conduct, and the fidelity to the marriage vows is a
moral obligation, the violation of which may be made a public
offense.1
7o
Undoubtedly, cases involving the duty to protect and provide for one's
family reach far beyond the concern of the immediate parties, for they
affect the status of the family as the very foundation of society and
hence are, in a very certain sense, of wide public concern.
The ground upon which the constitutionality of abandonment and
nonsupport statutes is frequently challenged is that such statutes are
support a child, whether or not the child is abandoned) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-2
(Supp. 1959) (neglect or failure to support an illegitimate child); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-326 (1953) (abandonment of any child by its mother). It should be
noted that all of the statutes require a criminal intent. In North Carolina aban-
donment and nonsupport must be willful to be punishable.
1" CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-304, -309 (1958).
""N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-322 (Supp. 1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. 14-325, -326
(1953) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 49-2 (Supp. 1959).
..8 Sellers v. Murphy, 207 Ala. 290, 92 So. 661 (1922) ; Murphy v. State, 171
Ark. 620, 286 S.W. 871 (1926) ; Ex parte Mitchell, 19 Cal. App. 567, 126 Pac. 856
(1912) ; State v. Cucullu, 110 La. 1087, 35 So. 300 (1903) ; State v. English, 101
S.C. 304, 85 S.E. 721 (1915) ; State v. Latham, 136 Tenn. 30, 188 S.W. 534 (1916) ;
Ex parte Strong, 95 Tex. Crim. 250, 252 S.W. 767 (1923) ; Spencer v. State, 132
Wis. 509, 112 N.W. 462 (1907).... Murphy v. State, 171 Ark. 620, 286 S.W. 871 (1926).
17 Id. at 623-24, 286 S.W. at 872.
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violative of the constitutional guaranty against imprisonment for debt.
The attack upon this ground has been entirely unsuccessful. The courts
are in accord in holding that a man's liability to support his family is
not a debt within the contemplation of the constitutional guaranty against
imprisonment.' 7 ' This was explicitly stated by the North Carolina court
in Ritchie v. White,17 2 although in that case the court was not construing
the validity of any North Carolina support statutes.
The North Carolina statutes making abandonment and nonsupport
criminal offenses were enacted in 1868.173 The first section of the origi-
nal act is now codified in N.C. Gen. Stat. section 14-322. This section,
relating to abandonment and failure to support by husband and parent,
has been amended and re-written several times. It was last rewritten
in 1957.174 Formerly, it provided as follows: "[I]f any husband shall
willfully abandon his wife without providing adequate support for such
wife, and the children he has begotten upon her, he shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor."' 75 The North Carolina Supreme Court decided in State
v. Belli 76 that this statute created two separate and distinct offenses.
It construed the statute as if it read as follows: "If any husband shall
willfully abandon his wife without providing adequate support for such
wife, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and if he shall willfully aban-
don the children which he may have begotten upon her without providing
adequate support for such children, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
Applying this construction of the statute, the court concluded that the
defendant could be convicted for the abandonment and nonsupport of
his children as separately charged in the first count of the three-count
indictment, notwithstanding the fact that prior to the commencement of
the criminal proceedings his wife had obtained a divorce a vinculo from
him with the result that he no longer owed her any duty of support. The
duty of the defendant to support his children, however, was not affected
by the divorce decree; his obligation to support them continued after the
marital relationship between him and his wife was severed by the law.
The abandonment and nonsupport statute now codified as N.C. Gen.
Stat. section 14-322 was amended in 1925 by adding a proviso to the
1. People v. Champion, 30 Cal. App. 463, 158 Pac. 501 (1916) ; Martin v. People,
69 Colo. 60, 168 Pac. 1171 (1917) ; State v. English, 101 S.C. 304, 85 S.E. 721
(1915) ; State v. Dixon, 138 Tenn. 195, 196 S.W. 486 (1917).
172 225 N.C. 450, 35 S.E.2d 414 (1945).
178 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-322 (Supp. 1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-323, -325
(1953).
"' N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-322 now reads as follows: "If any husband shall wilfully
abandon his wife without providing her with adequate support or if any father or
mother shall wilfully neglect or refuse to provide adequate support for his or her
child or children, whether natural or adopted, whether or not he or she abandons
said child or children, he or she shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; and such wilful
neglect or refusal shall constitute a continuing offense and shall not be barred by
any statute of limitations until the youngest living child shall arrive at the age of
eighteen (18) years."
1,0 N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, ch. 209, § 1. 1"0184 N.C. 701, 115 S.E. 190 (1922).
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effect that abandonment of the children by the father should constitute
a continuing offense not barred by any statute of limitations until the
youngest child reached eighteen years of age . 7 7 As re-written in 1949,
the statute was extended to protect adopted children, to make the mother
as well as the father guilty of a misdemeanor for the willful abandonment
of children under eighteen years of age, to provide that the abandonment
of children by father or mother shall constitute a continuing offense not
barred by any statute of limitations until the youngest child reaches
eighteen years of age, and to incorporate the construction put on it by
the court in the Bell case, as creating two separate offenses.'78 In 1957
the statute was rewritten again. As to the children, it now provides, in
effect, that the willful neglect or refusal by either parent to provide ade-
quate support for them shall constitute a misdemeanor, whether or not
the children are abandoned. 7 0
The cases decided prior to the 1957 re-writing of the statute made it
indisputably clear that section 14-322 set out two distinct offenses:
(1) willful abandonment of the wife without adequate support, and (2)
willful abandonment of the children without adequate support, 8 0 and
that each of these offenses is comprised of two elements: (1) willful
abandonment, and (2) willful failure to provide adequate support.' 18
Several cases, all decided before 1957, have dealt with the requisites
of the abandonment and nonsupport offenses and the sufficiency of war-
rants and indictments to charge those offenses. It has been held that
since the abandonment and nonsupport of the wife on one hand and the
children on the other constitute two distinct offenses, the state, if it
wishes to prosecute for both offenses, must clearly set out each offense in
separate bills of indictment (which may be consolidated for trial) or in
separate counts of the same bill.'8 2 Moreover, the indictment or warrant,
in order to charge an offense under section 14-322, must allege every
""' N.C. Pub. Laws 1925, ch. 290. "s N.C. Sess. Laws 1949, ch. 810.17 Thus it would seem that there are three possible offenses under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-322 as now constituted: (1) abandonment and nonsupport of the wife;
(2) abandonment and nonsupport of the children; and (3) nonsupport of the
children.
"80 State v. Outlaw, 242 N.C. 220, 87 S.E.2d 303 (1955); State v. Lucas, 242
N.C. 84, 86 S.E.2d 770 (1955); State v. Johnson, 194 N.C. 378, 139 S.E. 697
(1927) ; State v. Bell, 184 N.C. 701, 115 S.E. 190 (1922). If the mother is guilty
of nonsupport, N.C. Gen Stat. § 14-322 provides a remedy and the remedy is ex-
clusive. Henson v. Thomas, 231 N.C. 173, 56 S.E.2d 432 (1949).
... State v. Outlaw, supira note 180; State v. Lucas, supra note 180; State v.
Smith, 241 N.C. 301, 84 S.E.2d 913 (1954);1 State v. Campo, 233 N.C. 79, 62 S.E.2d
500 (1950) ; State v. Carson, 228 N.C. 151, 44 S.E.2d 721 (1947) ; Hyder v. Hyder,
215 N.C. 239, 1 S.E.2d 540 (1939); State v. Johnson, supra note 180; State v.
Beam, 181 N.C. 597, 107 S.E. 429 (1921) ; State v. Toney, 162 N.C. 635, 78 S.E.
156 (1913). The husband's or father's abandonment is willful when he intention-
ally and without good excuse or justification separates himself from his wife or
children; his failure to support is willful when he intentionally and without just
cause or excuse, ceases to provide adequate support for his wife or children accord-
ing to his means or station in life. State v. Carson supra.... State v. Lucas, 242 N.C. 84, 86 S.E.2d 770 (1955).
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element of the offense. Thus, in State v. Lucas,18 3 where the indictment
charged that the defendant "unlawfully and willfully did abandon his
wife, one Eunice Lucas, without providing adequate support for her, the
said Eunice Lucas and minor child, namely Marie Lucas . . . ," the
court held that although the indictment was sufficient to charge the
defendant for the willful abandonment of his wife without providing
adequate support for her, it was not sufficient to charge him for the
offense of willfully abandoning his child without providing adequate
support for her. And in State v. Outlaw'5 4 the court allowed a motion
in arrest of judgment upon a warrant charging that defendant willfully
failed to provide adequate support for his wife and children, but failing
to charge that he willfully abandoned either, on the ground that the war-
rant was insufficient to charge any offense under section 14-322. The
warrant in the Outlaw case was also insufficient to charge an offense
under section 14-325, which punishes the willful neglect of a husband
to provide adequate support for his wife and children while living with
his wife, because the warrant failed to allege that the defendant com-
mitted the offense while living with his wife.8 5  In State v. Smith'80
a warrant charging that the defendant willfully failed and refused to
provide adequate support for his children in violation of section 14-322
was held to be fatally defective because it failed to allege the essential
element of willful abandonment of the children. On the other hand, an
indictment which merely charged the defendant with the abandonment
of his wife and children was held, in State v. May, 87 to be insufficient
for the reason that it did not allege a failure to support them. 8 8
It should be noted, of course, that the 1957 amendement of section 14-
322 would change the result of these cases in so far as they apply to the
283 Ibid. 184 242 N.C. 220, 87 S.E.2d 303 (1955).
211 For other decisions on the sufficiency of the warrant or indictment to charge
an offense under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-325, see State v. Stone, 231 N.C. 324, 56
S.E.2d 675 (1949), where the court held that the trial court had the authority to
permit the solicitor to amend a warrant charging the defendant with willful neglect
to support his wife and children by inserting the words, "while living with his wife,"
to conform to the language of N.C. Gen Stat § 14-325, and that as amended the
warrant was sufficient to charge the defendant with an offense under that section;
State v. Kerby, 110 N.C. 558, 14 S.E. 856 (1892), where it was held that a warrant
which followed the words of the statute was sufficient.
180241 N.C. 301, 84 S.E.2d 913 (1954).
1.7 132 N.C. 1020, 43 S.E. 819 (1903). In the May case, the indictment con-
tained two counts, one charging defendant with abandoning his wife and children
and another charging him with failing to support them. However, the court said
that it was evident from the record that the defendant was tried on the first count
alone, so under the familiar principle that each count in an indictment must be com-
plete in itself and contain all the essential elements of the offense charged therein,
the indictment had to be regarded as defective and the judgment arrested.
18. Except for the abandonment of a child under sixteen years of age by its
mother, which is an offense under N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-326, In re Adoption of Doe,
231 N.C. 1, 56 S.E.2d 8 (1940), abandonment alone is not a crime in North Caro-
lina. Fowler v. Ross, 196 F.2d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1952). The law does not require a
man to live with his wife and children, but it does require him to support them.
Hyder v. Hyder, 215 N.C. 239, 1 S.E.2d 540 (1939).
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offense against the children, because the willful neglect or refusal to
provide adequate support for the children, whether or not they have been
abandoned, is now an offense under that section. Consequently, an in-
dictment or warrant alleging the willful neglect or refusal to support the
children would be sufficient.
It should be noted also that the cases hold that the two-year statute
of limitations applicable to prosecutions of misdemeanors' 89 is applicable
to the first part of the statute, making willful abandonment and nonsup-
port of the wife a misdemeanor. It has been said that the crime of
willfull abandonment by the husband of the wife is not a continuing
offense, day by day, and where there has been a complete act of aban-
donment and no renewal of the marital association, the abandonment
must have occurred within two years prior to the date of the return of
the indictment. 1 0 However, renewal of cohabitation tolls the statute of
limitations; therefore where a man willfully abandons his wife, then later
sends remittances for her support, returns and cohabits with her for
awhile and again abandons her, his willfully leaving her the second time
without providing an adequate support for her is a new abandonment
and failure to support, and an indictment found within two years from
the date of the second abandonment is not barred by the statute of
limitations.'
On the other hand, the statute in express terms makes the aban-
donment and nonsupport of the children by the father or the mother a
continuing offense until the children reach the age of eighteen, so a
prosecution for this offense does not bar a subsequent prosecution for a
subsequent violation of the statute. 9 2 The prosecution of an offense of
this nature is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for an offense alleged to
have been committed at any time before the institution of the first prose-
cution; but it is not a bar to a subsequent prosecution for continuing the
offense thereafter, as this is a new violation of the law.193 Because of the
continuing nature of this offense, a defendant arrested in Georgia was ex-
traditable to North Carolina where it appeared that he temporarily came
into North Carolina, although for an innocent purpose, after the commis-
sion of the crime. He was a fugitive from justice when he again departed
from the State of North Carolina.1 4  In State v. Smith,19  where de-
fendant's motion in arrest of judgment was allowed because the warrant
""N.C. Gmx. STAT. § 15-1 (1953)."O' State v. Hedden, 187 N.C. 803, 123 S.E. 65 (1924) ; State v. Hooker, 186
N.C. 761, 120 S.E. 449 (1913) ; State v. Hannon, 168 N.C. 215, 83 S.E. 701 (1914).
... State v. Beam, 181 N.C. 597, 107 S.E. 429 (1921); State v. Hannon, supra
note 190.
"'2 State v. Lucas, 242 N.C. 84, 86 S.E. 2d 770 (1955); State v. Smith, 241 N.C.
301, 84 S.E. 2d 913 (1954).
... State v. Hinson, 209 N.C. 187, 183 S.E. 397 (1936); State v. Jones, 201 N.C.
424, 160 S.E. 468 (1931).
... Daugherty v. Hornsby, 151 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1945)."01241 N.C. 301, 84 S.E.2d 913 (1954).
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was fatally defective in failing to aver that defendant had willfully aban-
doned his children, the court pointed out that since section 14-322 makes
the abandonment of children a continuing offense not barred by any
statute of limitations, defendant was amenable to further prosecution on
the same charge by the state.
The correctness of the court's decision that the two-year statute of
limitations applies to the offense of abandonment and nonsupport of the
wife may be open to question, 196 particularly in view of the fact that the
court has consistently held that the offense is comprised of two elements,
abandonment and failure to support. While some of the earlier deci-
sions held that abandonment was the act to be punished, nevertheless, the
later cases, especially since State v. Bell, 97 have indicated that the intent
of the legislature was not to punish for abandonment as such, for which
no penalty was prescribed, but primarily to punish for the failure to
provide for the support of wives and children. Abandonment generally
is not a continuing offense in the sense that it constitutes a new offense
each day it continues; but as the husband's duty to support is a con-
tinuing one, 98 it would seem that after the husband has abandoned his
wife without making any provisions for her support, he should remain
amenable to prosecution for that dual-element offense as long as his failure
to support his wife continues, in the absence of a termination of the duty
to support her by divorce a vincula, death or otherwise, or in the absence
of a clear waiver by the wife of her right to support. However, the pro-
viso which was added to section 14-322 in 1925 by its terms denominates
as a continuing offense the abandonment of children and under the rules
of statutory construction, it seems, cannot be construed to apply to the
offense of abandonment and nonsupport of wives.199
Most statutes making abandonment or nonsupport of a wife an
offense do so only where the abandonment or nonsupport is willful, that
is, without good cause or justification. There is, however, no universal
rule as to what constitutes good cause or justification within the meaning
of the statute. What, then, are the defenses available to one accused of
willful abandonment and nonsupport? Condonation, while a defense to
an action for divorce, is no defense to a prosecution under section 14-322.
Abandonment of the wife is a statutory offense, and it is not condoned,
so far as the state's right to prosecute is concerned, by a subsequent
..6 See the concurring opinion of Clark, C. J., in State v. Bell, 184 N.C. 701,
710, 115 S.E. 190, 194 (1922). Admittedly, however, the court was probably con-
strued N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-322 in the only way in which it could be construed
under the wording of the statute. Therefore, the criticism of the court may be
misplaced; it should be directed toward the legislature instead.
7 o 184 N.C. 701, 115 S.E. 190 (1922).
10. State v. Beam, 181 N.C. 597, 107 S.E. 429 (1921).
1.0 This statute, being penal, must be strictly construed. State v. Carson, 228
N.C. 151, 44 S.E.2d 721 (1947); State v. Gardner, 219 N.C. 331; 13 S.E.2d 529
(1941).
1959]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
resumption of the marital relation.20 0  Consent, on the other hand, is a
good defense, for separation by consent is not an abandonment within
the meaning of the statute.
20 1
Adultery is a good defense to a prosecution for abandonment and non-
support. Where a wife is guilty of adultery, her husband is not liable
to prosecution for abandonment ;202 and an instruction to the jury which
deprives the defendant of this defense is reversible error. 20 3 In order to
avail himself of this defense, however, the defendant, where his evidence
tends to establish his wife's adultery, will have to request the court to
instruct the jury on this phase of his case.
20 4
Denial of paternity of the child defendant is charged with abandoning
is also a defense. Where the husband in an action for nonsupport of a
child admits the nonsupport, but denies that he is the father, and intro-
duces evidence in support of his contention, an instruction that with-
draws the question of the paternity of the child from the jury is reversible
error.
2 05
Desertion of the husband by the wife is a defense to a husband
charged with abandonment and nonsupport of his wife. The wife's
desertion or abandonment of her husband, if without just cause or good
excuse, is a justification or lawful reason for him not to support her.
He is not required to support her if she unjustifiably refuses to live with
him; but his offer to provide a home for her is not a defense if made in
bad faith.
20 6
While divorce is no defense to a prosecution under this section for
abandonment and nonsupport of the children, 20 7 it may be a defense to
a prosecution for abandonment and nonsupport of his wife, depending
upon such factors as the divorce decree and the time the alleged aban-
donment was committed. Where the husband has been indicted, tried,
and convicted for the criminal abandonment of his wife under this section,
and upon appeal he has been granted a new trial, the fact that since his
former conviction his wife has obtained a divorce a vinculo from him will
not constitute a defense to him.
2 0 8
Former jeopardy, autrefois convict, and autrefois acquit are good
defenses to a prosecution for abandonment and nonsupport of the wife
200 State v. Manon, 204 N.C. 52, 167 S.E. 493 (1933).
201 State v. Carson, 228 N.C. 151, 44 S.E2d 721 (1947) ; State v. Smith, 164
N.C. 475, 79 S.E. 979 (1913). The resumption of the conjugal relation ordinarily
rescinds a separation agreement; therefore when the defendant renews the rela-
tionship by intermittent visits to his wife and subsequently fails to support her, the
separation agreement is no longer available to him as a defense. State v. Gossett,
203 N.C. 641, 166 S.E. 754 (1932).
.2 State v. Hopkins, 130 N.C. 647, 40 S.E. 973 (1902).
20' State v. Johnson, 194 N.C. 378, 139 S.E. 697 (1927).
20. State v. Hannon, 168 N.C. 215, 83 S.E. 701 (1914).
20. State v. Ray, 195 N.C. 628, 143 S.E. 216 (1928).
20' State v. Smith, 164 N.C. 475, 79 S.E. 979 (1913).
..7 State v. Bell, 184 N.C. 701, 115 S.E. 190 (1922).
20' State v. Faulkner, 185 N.C. 635, 116 S.E. 168 (1923).
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in the absence of a resumption of conjugal relations with her after the
original abandonment and prosecution, as this offense is not a continuing
one under the North Carolina decisions.20 9 It is submitted that this rule
is equally as questionable as the rule (criticized above) that a prosecu-
tion of the husband for the offense of abandonment and nonsupport of
his wife is barred by the two-year statute of limitations if the abandon-
ment occurred more than two years prior to the date of the return of
the indictment. Yet, apparently, both rules still apply to the offense of
abandonment and nonsupport of the wife,210 although there have been
no recent cases directly in point. On the other hand, abandonment and
nonsupport of the children is clearly a continuing offense; so in a prose-
cution for that offense under this section, a plea of autrefois convict of
the same offense is good as to the period prior to the conviction, but is
not a bar to a prosecution for failure to provide adequate support for
his children subsequent to the prior conviction.211 It is also the rule that
termination of a prosecution in the defendant's favor on the ground that
the indictment was defective will not preclude a subsequent prose-
cution.
2 1 2
It is no defense to the husband in a prosecution for abandonment and
nonsupport that the marriage was contracted to avoid punishment for
seduction,213 that his wife was unchaste prior to marriage, 214or, ordi-
narily, that the marriage is voidable where it has not been annulled prior
200 State v. Hannon, 168 N.C. 215, 83 S.E. 701 (1914) ; State v. Dunston, 78
N.C. 418 (1878). In a case where the defendant was charged with the abandon-
ment and nonsupport of his wife and his children, it was held that an announcement
by the solicitor, made before entering upon the trial, that he would not prosecute
the defendant for the abandonment and nonsupport of his wife was tantamount to a
nolle prosequi or acquittal on that charge. State v. Brigman, 201 N.C. 793, 161
S.E. 727 (1931). As a general rule, however, a nolle prosequi in a criminal action
will not support a plea of former jeopardy upon a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense, while an acquittal will support such a plea.
2 0 State v. Johnson, 212 N.C. 566, 571, 194 S.E. 319, 322 (1937), which held
that the neglect or refusal to support an'illegitimate child under N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 49-2 is a continuing offense, and the prior prosecution is not a bar to a prosecu-
tion for a breach of the statute for the period subsequent to defendant's release from
imprisonment imposed in the first prosecution, there appeared this dictum: "We do
not consider that former decisions of this Court, under the provisions of ... [N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-322] are in point or controlling. An essential element of the crime
created by that statute is abandonment Without proof of abandonment a convic-
tion cannot be had. This is certainly true up until the time the act was amended
to make the offense as to the children a continuing offense. An abandonment takes
place at a time certain. It cannot be continuing in its nature. The moment a
husband separates himself from his wife with the intent to discontinue the marital
relations and to disregard and shirk the marital obligations and responsibilities in
respect to providing for support, and otherwise, abandonment is complete. The
husband cannot again commit the same crime, as to the wife, without first re-
assuming the marital relations."
211 State v. Jones, 201 N.C. 424, 160 S.E. 468 (1931).
212 State v. Smith, 241 N.C. 301, 84 S.E.2d 913 (1954).
.1 State v. English, 101 S.C. 304, 85 S.E. 721 (1915).
21 Commonwealth v. Branthoover, 98 Pa. Super. 87 (1929). Confra, Burdes v.
Burdes, 195 Misc. 265, 90 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1949).
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to his prosecution.21 5  Whether or not the defendant can raise as a
defense the fact that the marriage was voidable (certainly he can if it is
void) is uncertain in North Carolina; but it would appear not to be a
valid defense if the marriage had not been avoided prior to the time of
prosecution for abandonment and nonsupport, since voidable marriages
are generally deemed valid until avoided.
216
Evidence in a prosecution for abandonment and nonsupport of a
wife is governed, of course, by the law of evidence in criminal cases
generally. Since the misconduct of the wife after she has been abandoned
by her husband is no defense to the husband in a criminal prosecution
against him for abandonment, such misconduct cannot be proved by the
husband unless it is connected with and tends to illustrate and explain
similar acts committed by her before the separation. The defendant may
put the chastity of his wife in issue by cross-examination or otherwise,
but the burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
remains on the state throughout the trial. Since the defendant may be
acquitted without introducing any evidence in his behalf, when he puts
the chastity of his wife in issue he does not assume the burden of satis-
fying the jury of the adultery of his wife, nor does he relieve the state of
its burden. Hence it is error for the court to charge the jury that the
burden is on the defendant to satisfy the jury of the adultery of the wife,
"not beyond a reasonable doubt, nor by the greater weight of the evidence,
but simply to your satisfaction. '217 Under N.C. Gen. Stat. section 8-57
the wife is a competent witness against her husband as to the fact of aban-
donment or neglect to provide adequate support. 218 She is also a com-
petent witness to prove the fact of marriage, 219 the rule to the contrary
2" Bostic v. State, 1 Ala. App. 255, 55 So. 260 (1911) (contracted under du-
ress) ; State v. McPherson, 72 Wash. 371, 130 Pac. 481 (1913) (contracted by an
infant). In State v. Oaks, 24 Del. 576, 76 Atl. 480 (1910), it was held that de-
fendant was estopped to set up as a defense the fact that his wife was already
married when she married him where he had acguired knowledge of that fact
within six months after his marriage to her, but nevertheless had children by her
and continued to live with her for 28 years.
216 It was held in State v. Gibson, 202 N.C. 108, 161 S.E. 708 (1932), that the
husband was not authorized to attack collaterally the validity of the marriage in
a prosecution for abandonment on the ground that his consent to the marriage was
obtained by his wife's false representation that she was pregnant. However, the
case is questionable authority on the point since the amendment of N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 51-3 in 1953.
217 State v. Falkner, 182 N.C. 793, 108 S.E. 756 (1921).
218 State v. Brown, 67 N.C. 470 (1872). The Browa case held that the wife
was a competent witness against her husband as to the fact of abandonment or
neglect to provide adequate support in a prosecution of the husband for the abandon-
ment and non-support of his wife and children; but that she was not a competent
witness as to the fact of marriage. On the latter point, the case was superseded by
the 1933 amendment to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57.
219 State v. Chester, 172 N.C. 946, 90 S.E. 697 (1916). This case overruled the
Browm case, supra note 218, on its holding that the wife was incompenent to prove
the fact of marriage. The Brown case was decided under an earlier form of N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 8-57. Prior to 1933 the wife was incompetent to testify against her
husband in a prosecution for abandoning or neglecting to provide support for the
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laid down in State v. Brown 220 having been superseded by an amendment
of section 8-57 in 1933. Section 14-323, which is the present codification
of the third section of the original abandonment statute of 1868, provides
for presumptive evidence that the abandonment and nonsupport of a
wife and children were willful. Willfulness is an essential element of the
crime of abandonment and nonsupport, but if the other elements are
proved and it is also proved that the defendant "neglects applying him-
self to some honest calling for the support of himself and family, and is
found sauntering about, endeavoring to maintain himself by gaming or
other undue means, or is a common frequenter of drinking houses, or is
a known common drunkard," it will be presumed that the abandonment
and neglect are willful. Thus, where abandonment and nonsupport are
both established or admitted, then, under this section, it is necessary for
the defendant to come forward with his evidence and proof that the aban-
donment and nonsupport were not willful in order to avoid the risk of
an adverse verdict.
221
Upon the conviction of a husband or parent for abandonment, the
judge, under section 14-324, may make such order as in his judgment will
best provide for the necessary support of the wife, or children, or both,
from the property or labor of the defendant, including a suspension of
sentence upon condition that the husband or parent properly support his
or her family.222 Thus, the criminal statutes on abandonment and non-
support offer an indirect way to compel the husband to support his wife
and the parent to support his or her child, since the court may suspend
sentence upon the condition that the defendant provide for the mainte-
nance of those persons he or she is required to support.
As the proceedings for the abandonment and nonsupport of wife
and children under section 14-322 and section 14-325 are criminal pro-
ceedings, they are instituted by the state exz relatione the wife and chil-
dren. In some states the wife must elect between civil and criminal
remedies for abandonment and nonsupport; but in North Carolina there
is no requirement of an election and the remedies are not mutually ex-
clusive. Instituting a criminal proceeding under the abandonment and
nonsupport statutes does not deprive the wife of her civil remedies under
sections 50-14 to -16 or the child of its civil remedies. However, when
the wife secures a decree for a divorce a zinculo, but without an award
of alimony, she cannot subsequently institute a criminal proceeding for
children. See State v. Brigman, 201 N.C. 793, 161 S.E. 727 (1931), which was
superseded by the 1933 amendment to N.C. Gen. Stat § 8-57.
20 67 N.C. 470 (1872).
22". State v. Falkner, 182 N.C. 793, 108 S.E. 756 (1921) ; Steel v. Steel, 104 N.C.
631, 10 S.E. 707 (.1890)."22 State v. Johnson, 230 N.C. 743, 55 S.E.2d 690 (1949) ; State v. Henderson,
207 N.C. 258, 176 S.E. 758 (1934); State v. Vickers, 197 N.C. 62, 147 S.E. 673
(1929).
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maintenance under the nonsupport statute because she is no longer the
wife of her former husband.
The statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. section 14-322, which makes it a criminal
offense for a parent to neglect or refuse to support his or her child
whether the child is abandoned or not,2 2 3 has no application to the parent
of an illegitimate child.2 2 4  Apart from contract or statute, the father
of an illegitimate child is not liable for its support. Of course, a contract
made by a father with the mother for the support of their illegitimate
child is as binding and enforceable as any other contract; and in addition
to the mother's right to sue upon the contract, the child may also main-
tain an action to enforce the contract.2 2 5  In the absence of contract
there are no other civil remedies available to the illegitimate child, and
such a child's only right to support from its putative father is that created
by the bastardy statute.2 2 6 Prior to 1933 a proceeding under the bas-
tardy statute to compel a parent to support his illegitimate child was
civil in nature, as it is in most states. However, in 1933 the North
Carolina legislature changed the approach to the problem; it repealed the
old law and set up a criminal statute. Presently, N.C. Gen. Stat. section
49-2 proscribes, as a misdemeanor, the willful neglect or refusal of any
parent to support and maintain his or her illegitimate child. The mere
begetting of an illegitimate child is not a crime under the act; it is the
... It should be noted that the 1957 amendment of N.C. Gen Stat. § 14-322 closed
a hiatus which had hitherto existed in the law of abandonment and nonsupport of
children in North Carolina. Prior to 1957, nonsupport of a child alone was not an
offense, because under that statute, failure to support had to be coupled with willful
abandonment, and both elements had to be charged in the indictment. State v.
Smith, 241 N.C. 301, 84 S.E.2d 913 (1954). On the other hand, failure of the
father to support his child while living with his wife was an offense under N.C.
Gen. Stat § 14-325, and the essential element "while living with his wife" had to
be alleged in the indictment. State v. Outlaw, 242 N.C. 220, 87 S.E.2d 303 (1955).
Not covered by either statute was the situation where the father, while not living
with his wife, and without having abandoned the child, nevertheless neglected or
refused to support it, as might easily occur in a case where the child was in the
father's custody. Presently under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-322 as amended in 1957, it
is a criminal offense for any parent to neglect or refuse to provide adequate support
for his or her child under eighteen years of age, natural or adopted, regardless of
whether or not the child was abandoned.
... Allen v. Hunnicutt, 230 N.C. 49, 52 S.E.2d 18 (1949) ; State v. Gardner, 219
N.C. 331, 13 S.E.2d 529 (1941). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-325 also is not applicable to
an illegitimate child.
22 Ray v. Ray, 219 N.C. 217, 13 S.E.2d 224 (1941) ; Conley v. Cabe, 198 N.C.
298, 151 S.E. 645 (1930) ; Redmon v. Roberts, 198 N.C. 161, 150 S.E. 881 (1929);
Thayer v. Thayer, 189 N.C. 502, 127 S.E. 553 (1925).0 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 49-3 to -9 (1950), as amended, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 49-2,
-4 (Supp. 1959) ; N.C. Gm. STAT. §7-103 (Supp. 1959) ; Allen v. Humicutt, 230
N.C. 49, 52 S.E.2d 18 (1949). The child is only an incidental beneficiary of the
meager statutory provisions for its support: "The duty of the putative father to
support his illegitimate child was not created primarily for the benefit of the child.
The legislation is social in nature and was enacted to prevent illegitimates from
becoming public charges. The benefit to the child is incidental." Allen v. Hunni-
cutt, supra at 51, 52 S.E.2d at 19.
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willful neglect or refusal to support and maintain227 the child which con-
stitutes the offense. 228  The North Carolina Supreme Court has held
that the statute does not violate due process of law or impose imprison-
ment but by the law of the land, since it raises no presumption against the
accused; but on the contrary, it requires the state to overcome the pre-
sumption of innocence, both as to the willfulness of the neglect to support
and the paternity of the illegitimate child, beyond a reasonable doubt.
Therefore, the statute is constitutional.
229
As the statute is criminal, proceedings under it are conducted in the
name of the state and can be instituted only by the child's mother or her
personal representative, or, if the child is likely to become a public charge,
the superintendent of public welfare.280 The proceedings may be insti-
tuted in the superior courts or in inferior courts, except courts of jus-
tices of the peace and courts whose criminal jurisdiction is not in excess
of those of justices of the peace.
2 3 1
The prosecution of the reputed father under this statute must be insti-
tuted within three years after the birth of the child,232 or, where the
putative father has acknowledged his paternity of the child by making
payments for the child's support within three years from its birth, then
within three years from the last payment but not after the child reaches
the age of eighteen ;233 or if the paternity has been judicially determined
within three years from the birth of the child, at any time before it be-
comes eighteen years of age.234  The prosecution of the mother of an
illegitimate child, by the express provisions of section 49-4, may be
instituted at any time before the child attains the age of eighteen years.
227 The statutory obligation to support and maintain the child is not restricted
to providing food; it includes the supplying of food, clothing, shelter, medical
assistance reasonably required for the health of the child, and other necessities; and
it applies even in the case of a newly-born baby. State v. Love, 238 N.C. 283, 77
S.E.2d 501 (1953). The willful failure to pay for medical expenses incurred upon
the birth of the child is not a criminal offense under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 49-2. State
v. Ferguson, 243 N.C. 766, 92 S.E.2d 197 (1956) ; State v. Stiles, 228 N.C. 137, 44
S.E.2d 728 (1947) ; State v. Summerlin, 224 N.C. 178, 29 S.E.2d 462 (1944). How-
ever, the court upon conviction, may require the defendant to pay for such expenses
under N.C. Gen. Stat § 49-8.
'2' State v. Coppedge, 244 N.C. 590, 94 S.E.2d 569 (1956) ; State v. Chambers,
238 N.C. 373, 78 S.E.2d 209 (1953) ; State v. Robinson, 236 N.C. 408, 72 S.E.2d
857 (1952).
2 State v. Spillman, 210 N.C. 271, 186 S.E. 322 (1936).
230 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-5 (1950) ; State v. Robinson, 245 N.C. 10, 95 S.E.2d
126 (1956). Although the point has not yet been passed upon by the North Carolina
court, apparently the child cannot institute the proceedings.
"1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-7 (1950) ; State v. Robinson, supra note 230. The
Domestic Relations Court has jurisdiction of cases under the bastardy statute. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7-103 (Supp. 1959). A justice of the peace may issue a warrant under
the bastardy statute, but the defendant must be tried in a court of greater criminal
jurisdiction.2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-4 (Supp. 1959).
... State v. Dill, 224 N.C. 57, 29 S.E.2d 145 (1944) ; State v. Moore, 222 N.C.
356, 23 S.E.2d 31 (1942) ; State v. Hodges, 217 N.C. 625, 9 S.E.2d 24 (1940)."' State v. Robinson, 245 N.C. 10, 95 S.E.2d 126 (1956).
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In order to convict a parent under section 49-2, the state must allege
and prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant's paternity
(where the defendant is the putative father, as is usually the case; how-
ever the mother of an illegitimate child is also criminally liable under the
statute for failure of support it), (2) of an illegitimate child who is less
than eighteen years of age, and (3) the willful neglect or refusal to
support the child. While the state must allege and establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is the father of the child he is charged
with failing to support, nevertheless, it is not required that the question
of paternity should be judicially determined first in a separate and dis-
tinct action. It may be determined in the main prosecution for the
offense. The Supreme Court pointed out in State v'. Lowe23 5 that the
usual practice is to submit to the jury: (1) the issue as to the defendant's
paternity of the child, (2) the issue as to his willful neglect or refusal to
support the child, and (3) the issue as to his guilt of the offense charged.
Willfulness will not be presumed from the failure to support; it must
be alleged and proved as the sine qua non of the offense. Therefore, a
warrant or indictment which fails to allege that defendant's neglect or
refusal to support his illegitimate child was willful is fatally defective, 230
and a warrant which merely charges defendant with being the father of
an unborn illegitimate child charges no offense at all.
237
The state also has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant's neglect or refusal to support his illegitimate child
was willful, that is, intentional and without just cause, excuse or justi-
fication after notice and a request for support.238 Moreover, it must be
established that the defendant's willful failure to support occurred prior
to the commencement of a criminal prosecution against him. Thus,
evidence of a willful refusal of a demand for support after the issuance
"- 238 N.C. 238, 77 S.E.2d 501 (1953).
... State v. Smith, 246 N.C. 118, 97 S.E.2d 442 (1957) ; State v. Coppedge, 244
N.C. 590, 94 S.E.2d 569 (1956); State v. Moore, 238 N.C. 743, 78 S.E.2d 914
(1953) ; State v. Morgan, 226 N.C. 414, 38 S.E.2d 166 (1946) ; State v. Vanderlip,
225 N.C. 610, 35 S.E.2d 885 (1945). As the offense is a continuing one, the dismis-
sal or quashing of a warrant, or an indictment, or the arresting of a judgment, will
not bar a subsequent prosecution on a new warrant or indictment. State v. Cop-
pedge, supra; State v. Perry, 241 N.C. 119, 84 S.E.2d 329 (1954) ; State v. Cham-
bers, 238 N.C. 373, 78 S.E.2d 209 (1953). Further, a prior prosecution is not a
bar to a prosecution for breach of the statute during the period subsequent to the
defendant's release from imprisonment imposed in the first prosecution. State v.
Johnson, 212 N.C. 566, 194 S.E. 319 (1937).
2 7 State v. Tyson, 208 N.C. 231, 180 S.E. 85 (1935).
"' State v. Chambers, 238 N.C. 373, 78 S.E.2d 209 (1953). In State v. McDay,
232 N.C. 388, 61 S.E2d 86 (1950), the Supreme Court held that an instruction
defining willful as "wrongfully and unjustifiably, without valid and good excuse,"
instead of defining it as an intentional neglect or refusal constituted reversible error.
See also State v. Ellison, 230 N.C. 59, 52 S.E.2d 9 (1949) ; State v. Stiles, 228
N.C. 137, 44 S.E.2d 728 (1947); State v. Hayden, 224 N.C. 779, 32 S.E.2d 333
,(1944).
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of a warrant is incompetent. 23 9  In the recent case of State v. Perry 40
the court, in a per curiam opinion, reversed a conviction for willful
failure to support an illegitimate child where the evidence disclosed that
no demand for support of the child was made upon the defendant until
after the warrant was drawn.
In a prosecution of the putative father under the bastardy statute,
the mother of the child may testify as to the acts of illicit intercourse with
the defendant, that he is the father of the child, and that he admitted
paternity. However, where the child was conceived during the wedlock
of the mother, permitting her to testify to the nonaccess of her husband
is reversible error.2 41  A section of the bastardy statute, section 49-7,
permits the results of a blood grouping test, which the court may order
upon motion of the defendant, to be admitted into evidence on the issue
of paternity. However, it seems that this section, although never ex-
pressly repealed, has been superseded by a broader statute, N.C. Gen.
Stat. section 8-50.1, which contains virtually identical provisions appli-
cable to any criminal action in which the question of paternity arises
and extends legislative approval to the use of blood grouping tests in
civil actions in which paternity is a relevant issue.242
It has been held that a judgment of nonsuit does not constitute an
adjudication of the paternity issue in defendant's favor; therefore, a sub-
sequent prosecution for an alleged failure to support his illegitimate child,
relating to a later period, is not barred by the prior prosecution, since
the offense is a continuing one.243  However, if it is judicially deter-
"' State v. Sharpe, 234 N.C. 154, 66 S.E.2d 655 (1951).
2,0 241 N.C. 119, 84 S.E. 329 (1954) ; see also State v. White, 225 N.C. 351,
34 S.E.2d 139 (1945). Where the evidence is conflicting as to whether a demand
was made before or after the issuance of the warrant, the question is for the jury.
State v. Humphrey, 236 N.C. 608, 73 S.E.2d 479 (1952).
... State v. Bowman, 231 N.C. 51, 55 S.E.2d 789 (1949) ; State v. Bowman, 230
N.C. 203, 52 S.E.2d 345 (1949).
2"4 See comment on the 1949 enactment of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-50.1 in 27 N.C.L.
REv. 456 (1949). Apparently, the results of such tests are relevant only when
offered to prove that the defendant, alleged putative father, is not the father of the
child whose paternity is in question. STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EViDENCE § 86
(1946).
242 State v. Ferguson, 243 N.C. 766, 92 S.E.2d 197 (1956). In this case the
defendant was first tried in the Domestic Relations Court on a warrant which
initially charged him with willfully refusing to provide medical care incident to
pregnancy, but was amended, after the birth of the child, to charge his willful re-
fusal to support his illegitimate child. Upon defendant's conviction he appealed to
the Superior Court and a nonsuit was allowed. Subsequently, defendant was
charged with nonsupport in a new warrant and his plea of former jeopardy was
allowed by the Domestic Relations Court. The state appealed and defendant was
convicted in the Superior Court. On defendant's appeal to the Supreme Court, it
was held that: (1) the nonsuit on the first warrant was proper because the warrant
initially failed to charge any criminal offense and it could not be amended to charge
an offense which was committed, if committed at all, after the warrant was issued;
(2) the judgment of nonsuit did not constitute a negative finding on the issue of
paternity so a subsequent prosecution relating to a later period was not barred, since
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 49-2 creates a continuing offense; and (3) under N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 15-179, which governs appeals by the state in criminal cases, the state had no
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mined in a prosecution for willful nonsupport that the defendant is the
father of the child, then though he is acquitted on the charge of willful
failure to support the child, nevertheless, the issue of paternity will be
foreclosed thereafter under the doctrine of res judicata. Therefore, the
defendant may be prosecuted subsequently, for the willful neglect or
refusal to support his illegitimate child and the question of paternity
will no longer be an open one.244 It would be wise for a defendant wish-
ing to avoid the consequence to appeal from the judgment establishing
his paternity of a child, notwithstanding the fact that the issue as to his
guilt of the offense of willful nonsupport was found in his favor. Such
an appeal is expressly permited under a 1947 amendment of section
49-7.245
After the court has determined that the defendant is the father of the
illegitimate child in question and that he has willfully neglected or refused
to provide for its support, then it must proceed to fix a specific sum of
money which is necessary for the child's support. In arriving at an
adequate amount, the court is required to consider the circumstances of
the particular case, the defendant's financial ability and earning capacity,
and the defendant's willingness to cooperate for the welfare of the child.
Then the court may order the defendant to pay the specified amount in
a lump sum or periodic installments, depending upon the circumstances
of the case, and it may modify the order from time to time.246 In addi-
tion to its order directing the defendant to make payments, the court, in
the original order or a subsequent modification thereof, may also do any
or all of the following things: commit the defendant to prison for a term
not to exceed six months; suspend his sentence and continue the case;
release him from custody on probation upon the condition that he comply
with all the terms of his probation, including payment of the sums fixed
for the support of his child; order him to pay to the child's mother the
necessary expenses of birth and medical attention; or require him to
right to appeal from a judgment sustaining a defendant's plea of former jeopardy.
Therefore, all subsequent proceedings in the case were a nullity.
24 State v. Clonch, 242 N.C. 760, 89 S.E.2d 469 (1955); see also State v.
Robinson, 245 N.C. 10, 95 S.E.2d 126 (1956).
" State v. Clement, 230 N.C. 614, 54 S.E.2d 919 (1949), superseding State v.
Hiatt, 211 N.C. 116, 189 S.E. 124 (1937). By the express statutory language of
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 49-5 preliminary proceedings to determine the paternity of the
child may be initiated and determined before the birth of the child; and, in its
discretion, the court may continue the proceedings until after the birth of the child,
taking the recognizance of the accused to assure his appearance. State v. Robinson,
supra note 244. The defendant, however, cannot be held criminally liable for failure
to support an unborn child. State v. Thompson, 233 N.C. 345, 64 S.E.2d 157 (1951).
An adjudication of the paternity issue at this stage would be valid although the
court exceeded its power and prematurely passed on the issue of defendant's guilt
of nonsupport. State v. Robinson, supra.2 l N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-7 (1950).
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sign a recognizance with security for compliance with any order the
court may make.
2 47
Here again the sanctions of the criminal law are used to accomplish
a bit of social engineering, albeit far too narrow a bit, namely, that of
preventing illegitimate children from becoming burdens on the tax-
payers.2 48  The community's concern should not be limited to the pro-
tection of the public purse, however. For economic, if not for humane,
reasons, the community should be concerned about helping the children,
who are already stigmatized for circumstances they had no part in cre-
ating, to become useful members of society.
VII
JURIsDICTION IN ABANDONMENT AND NONSUPPORT CASES
One of the most troublesome problems has been saved for the last,
namely, that of jurisdiction. Where are the offenses of abandonment
and nonsupport deemed to be committed? Even a cursory perusal of
the cases will quickly reveal that there is substantial disagreement among
the states on questions of jurisdiction and venue in nonsupport cases.
This is due in part to confusion with respect to the nature of the crimi-
nal act, in part to a diversity of views with respect to the place where
the criminal act occurs, in part to variations in the wording of applicable
statutes, and in part to differences with reference to the primary purpose
of criminal nonsupport statutes. It is principally because of the problem
of jurisdiction that there have been such new developments in this area
of law as the Uniform Desertion and Nonsupport Act, the Uniform
Support of Dependents Act, and most recently, the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act.
First, it is an elementary principle of the common law that the crimi-
nal law of a state has no extra-territorial effect, and one state will not
enforce the criminal law of another state. Second, at common law
jurisdiction over a criminal offense is determined by the place of the
commission of the crime, and the crime is deemed committed at the
place where the act takes effect. This, in sumary, is the common law
territorial theory of jurisdiction, which was a logical outgrowth of the
English conception of criminal justice as a means of keeping the king's
2" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-8 (1950). It was held in the recent case of State v.
Robinson, 248 N.C. 282, 103 S.E.2d 376 (1958), that a Domestic Relations Court
has authority, upon conviction of a defendant for willful refusal to support her
illegitimate child, to suspend sentence upon condition that defendant pay a stipu-
lated sum per week into court for the support of the child, under N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 49-7, -8. However, in that case, which involved a charge of willful neglect and
nonsupport against a mother of an illegitimate child, the court remanded the cause
in order for the judge below to determine whether or not the failure of the de-
fendant to make weekly payments was without lawful excuse so as to justify putting
into effect the supended sentence.
., Allen v. Hunnicutt, 230 N.C. 49, 52 S.E.2d 18 (1949).
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peace. Under this conception, the jurisdiction of a state to punish for
crime is limited to acts done within its boundary lines. Obviously, how-
ever, people do acts which do not take place wholly within one state, so
statutes have been enacted to cope with such cases. For example, in
the famous case of State v. Hal2 49 the defendants, while standing in
North Carolina, shot across the state line and killed their victim in Ten-
nessee. Because of the common law rule that an act across a boundary
line is punishable in the state where the act takes effect, it was held that
the defendants could not be punished for the homicide by North Carolina.
The crime was committed in Tennessee; therefore, that state would have
to try the defendants. Subsequently, in the second Hall case250 it was
held that the defendants could not, under the federal extradition stat-
ute,251 be extradited to Tennessee due to the fact that, although they had
committed a crime in Tennessee, they bad not committed a crime there
and also fled from the state as fugitives from justice. Presence in the
demanding state at the time the alleged crime was committed is a pre-
requisite of extradition under the federal extradition act.252
The gap in the law illustrated by the Hall case was eventually closed
by a series of statutes-specifically N.C. Gen. Stat. section 15-132,
249 114 N.C. 910, 19 S.E. 602 (1894).
220 State v. Hall, 115 N.C. 811, 20 S.E. 729 (1894). Having been released after
the decision in the first Hall case, the defendants were rearrested and held under
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-49 for extradition. Upon the petition for habeas corpus, it was
decided that as the defendants were not fugitives, they could not be held for extra-
dition under the North Carolina statute, nor could they be extradited under the
federal statute. N.C. Gen Stat. § 15-49 was amended the next year to provide, in
pertinent part, that any one of certain judicial officers therein named "on satis-
factory information laid before him that any fugitive or other person in the State
has committed ... any offense" is authorized to issue a warrant for his arrest.
..1 Interstate Rendition Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1959). Technically, the term
"extradition" refers to the surrender, between nations, of persons charged with
crime. As between states, such surrender is referred to as "interstate rendition,"
and the federal statute cited as known as the Interstate Rendition Act. However,
the terms are frequently used without differentiation.
22 Extradition is provided for in the U.S. Constitution as follows: "A person
charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other crime, who shall flee from
Justice and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority
of the State from which he fled be delivered up, to be removed to the State having
Jurisdiction of the crime." U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2. This section was very early
declared not to be self-executing and Congress enacted several statutes implementing
it. Interstate Rendition Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-95 (1952). Both federal and state
courts have construed the provisions of the Constitution and the implementing
statutes as requiring the actual physical presence of the accused in the demanding
state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime and a subsequent flight
therefrom in order for him to be a fugitive from justice within the meaning of the
extradition laws. Hyatt v. People ex rel. Corkran, 188 U.S. 691 (1903) ; Daugherty
v. Hornsby, 151 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1945) ; Ex pare Brewer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 388,
143 P.2d 33 (1933) ; Fowler v. Ross, 196 F.2d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1952). Strassheim
v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911), placed one limitation on this doctrine by holding
that one who had commited an overt act in the demanding state which resulted
in a crime there after he had fled from the state could be extradited. However, the
presence requirement has generally been extended to the abandonment and non-
support cases. People ex rel. Higley v. Millspaw, 281 N.Y. 441, 24 N.E.2d 117
(1939).
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making criminal, and so punishable in North Carolina, acts committed
within the state which result in harm to persons outside the state, and
finally section 6 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act enacted in
1937 and codified as N.C. Gen. Stat. section 15-60,253 providing for ex-
tradition to the demanding state of any person who intentionally commits
an act outside the demanding state which results in a crime in the de-
manding state.
The offense of abandonment and nonsupport must be considered in
the light of these principles of criminal jurisdiction. As has been pointed
out previously in this article, the substantive crime of abandonment and
nonsupport of a wife by a husband is a single offense consisting of two
essential elements: willful abandonment coupled with willful failure to
support. Apparently, the act of abandonment is not a continuing offense
under the North Carolina cases, while the willful failure to support is a
continuing offense under the cases, on the ground that the duty to sup-
port is a continuing one in the absence of circumstances which would
legally terminate the duty or excuse the nonperformance of it.
254 It
seems to be the view under these decisions that abandonment is com-
mitted where the act of desertion, or unjustifiable cessation of cohabita-
tion with an intent not to resume cohabitation, actually occurs (implying
physical presence at the place where the wife resides and a subsequent
withdrawal from that place) ; and the willful failure to provide support
is committed at the residence of the person to whom the duty of support
is owed, regardless of whether or not the person who owes the duty has
ever been present at that place.
255
Thus, in North Carolina, in order for a husband to be convicted of
the offense of abandonment and nonsupport (and prior to the 1957
amendment of section 14-322 this applied to a parent charged with the
abandonment and nonsupport of his or her child), he must have will-
fully abandoned his wife without providing adequate support for her.
Nonsupport alone would not constitute the offense of abandonment and
.13 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-60 provides as follows: "Extradition of persons not
present in demanding state at time of commission of crime. The Governor of this
State may also surrender, on demand of the executive authority of any other state,
any person in this State charged in such other state in the manner provided in
Section 15-57 with committing an act in this State, or in a third state, intentionally
resulting in a crime in the state whose executive authority is making the demand,
and the provisions of this article not otherwise inconsistent, shall apply to such
cases, even though the accused was not in that state at the time of the commission
of the ctine, and has iot fied therefrom." (Emphasis added.)
"' State v. Sneed, 197 N.C. 668, 150 S.E. 197 (1929).
... We are dealing here with negative acts, criminal omissions. A criminal
omission occurs at the place where there is a legal duty to act. When the legal
duty is owed to a particular person, the obligation and the liability for failure to
perform it follow the obligee. It is generally recognized that the crime of non-support is committed at the residence of those to whom, by law, a duty of support is
owed. People v. Hennefent, 315 Ill. App. 141, 42 N.E.2d 663 (1942). Contra, State
v. Fick, 140 La. 1063, 74 So. 554 (1917) (crime is committed at place where obligor
resides).
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nonsupport under section 14-322 unless preceded by abandonment.
Moreover, both of the essential acts must have taken place in North
Carolina.256  If the abandonment occurred outside of the state, the North
Carolina courts would not have jurisdiction to try the accused. 25 7  It has
been intimated, however, in some cases, that North Carolina would have
jurisdiction to prosecute the husband for abandonment if either the hus-
band or the wife were a domiciliary of the state at the time of the original
abandonment.
258
There is no reason why abandonment should not be regarded as a
continuing offense and as one not requiring the presence of the perpe-
trator at the place where it is consummated. As long as the husband
remains separated from his wife and leaves her destitute, or to the mer-
cies of charitable agencies, relatives or friends, and as long as he intends
to divest himself of all obligations owed to her and to have no further
ties with her, he should be regarded as abandoning his wife, even if she
is residing in a state he has never entered.
Actually, a solution to the problem of jurisdiction in the case where
abandonment is an element of criminal nonsupport and the abandon-
ment-in the sense of a wrongful separation coupled with a withdrawal
of support from the wife-occurs outside of the state can be found
within recognized common law principles. At common law a state has
no jurisdiction to punish a citizen of another state for an offense com-
mitted beyond its territorial limits, unless the act takes effect and con-
stitutes an offense within territorial linits. Acts done outside the state
which culminate in crime within the state are punishable in the state
where the acts take effect, provided that the state can obtain in personam
jurisdiction. Admittedly, by the better view a legislature cannot punish
2. This was said to be the law of North Carolina in Fowler v. Ross, 196 F.2d
25 (D.C. Cir. 1952). There is authority to support that interpretation of North
Carolina law. If the husband is domiciled in the state and the wife outside the
state, he may be prosecuted for the offense. State v. Hannon, 168 N.C. 215, 83
S.E. 701 (1914). If the wife is domiciled in the state and the husband outside, he
may be prosecuted. State v. Beam, 181 N.C. 597, 107 S.E. 429 (1921). In both
cases, however, the husband and wife had once been together in the state and subse-
quently, the husband had separated himself from, and withdrawn support from, his
wife: See also State v. Carson, 228 N.C. 151, 44 S.E.2d 721 (1947); State v.
Sneed, 197 N.C. 668, 150 S.E. 197 (1929).
" State v. Carson, mtpra note 256. In the Carson case, the defendant and his
wife lived in Virginia and they separated there; then he came to North Carolina,
where she followed him sometime later. The court held that the evidence was in-
sufficient to be submitted to the jury on the issue of abandonment, since it failed to
show an unjustifiable desertion or willful failure to support; but it also said, in
effect, that the court would have no jurisdiction of a prosecution of a husband for
willful abandonment of his wife without providing support for her if the abandon-
ment occurred outside the state, citing as controlling on that proposition State v.
Jones, 227 N.C. 94, 40 S.E2d 700 (1946), in which the court dismissed a prosecution
for aiding and abetting bigamy by entering into a marriage with a person then
married on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over the offense since the evi-
dence showed it was committed outside the state.
-' See note 256 mipra.
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acts by persons outside the state where the acts do not take effect and
constitute an injury and offense within its territorial limits. One of
the leading cases for this view is an early North Carolina case, State v.
Knight,259 in which it was held that the legislature could not punish the
counterfeiting of North Carolina bills of credit by citizens of Virginia
in Virginia. There are numerous other North Carolina cases to the
same effect. 260  But on the other hand, it is well established that a state
may punish acts of citizens of other states committed outside its terri-
torial limits, if the acts take effect and constitute an injury to its own
citizens within its limits. This the North Carolina court recognized in
the first Hall case261 when it decided that the defendant who, while
standing in North Carolina, fired a fatal shot across the state line and
killed his victim in Tennessee had, under the common law authorities,
committed murder in Tennessee and was therefore triable by the tribunals
of that state.
By analogy, a husband who, outside the state, wrongfully separates
himself from his wife with the intention of shirking the legal obligations
arising out of the marital relation and who willfully refuses or neglects
to support her thenceforth could be regarded as putting in motion, out-
side the state, forces which culminate, take effect, and constitute an
injury and offense within the state where the wife now resides. Conse-
quently, he should be amenable to the criminal laws of the state whose
taxpayers may have to provide the support that the husband is willfully
failing to provide, whenever and however the state can get in personam
jurisdiction over him; and, as between two states which have enacted
the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, he should be extraditable to the
injured state, although he was never present therein.
262
... 1 N.C. 143 (1799).
280 Thus the North Carolina court has held that it had no jurisdiction to try
the accused for: bigamy in South Carolina, State v. Jones, 227 N.C. 94, 40 S.E.2d
700 (1946) ; for larceny in South Carolina, State v. Buchanan, 130 N.C. 660, 41
S.E. 107 (1902) ; for murder in Tennessee, State v. Hall, 114 N.C. 910, 19 S.E. 602
(1893) ; for assault and battery in Tennessee, State v. Mitchell, 83 N.C. 674 (1880).
281114 N.C. 910, 19 S.E. 602 (1893).
- In many jurisdictions both elements of the dual element offense of abandon-
ment and nonsupport are continuing and neither element need be begun in the de-
manding state; therefore the offense can be committed by momentary presence
within the demanding state. People ex rel. Gottschalk v. Brown, 237 N.Y. 483, 143
N.E. 653 (1924) (absence of overt acts irrelevant since charge by its very nature is
founded, not upon commission of overt acts, but upon neglect of duty). On the
other hand, there has been a tendency on the part of the courts to refuse to extra-
dite, even under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, a defendant who was never
present in demanding state. People ex rel. Buck v. Britt, 187 Misc. 217, 62 N.Y.S.2d
479 (Sup. Ct 1946). Contra, Ex parte Bledsoe, 93 Okla. Crim. 302, 227 P.2d 680
(1951). In People ex tel. Kaufman v. O'Brien, 197 Misc. 1019, 96 N.Y.S.2d 401
(Sup. Ct. 1950), it was held that one apprehended in New York and imprisioned
upon warrant of the governor of New York and requisition for extradition under
indictment authenticated by the demanding executive authority and charging crime
of nonsupport of a minor, which was an indictable offense under laws of Ohio,
could be extradited from New York to Ohio, notwithstanding he was not in Ohio
at time of commission of the alleged crime nor a fugitive fr6m justice from that
state.
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There should be no bar, conceptual or otherwise, to the acceptance
of this view in North Carolina. In State v. Tickle,213 a case where the
accused was charged with the willful neglect and refusal to support his
illegitimate child, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that this state
had jurisdiction over the offense despite the defendant's total absence
from the state. In that case the child was conceived in Virginia, the
defendant had always lived there, and the mother worked there, although
she was a domiciliary of North Carolina. The mother, unable to get
support from the defendant, had returned to her family home in North
Carolina where the child was born. The defendant had "nothing to do"
with the mother's living arrangements; he ignored her letter pleading
for material assistance and remained in Virginia. But in an unwary
moment he went hunting in North Carolina, and on that trip he was
arrested and charged with nonsupport. On appeal from a conviction in
the court below the question presented was whether the court, having
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, had jurisdiction to try
him for the offense of willful failure to support his illegitimate child when
it appeared that the defendant, a nonresident, was living outside of the
state during all material stages of the offense.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in affirming the conviction,
held that North Carolina had jurisdiction to prosecute the defendant for
the crime of willful nonsupport of his illegitimate child despite his ab-
sence from the state. The court concluded that the injury contemplated
and proscribed by the statute actually occurred in North Carolina where
the child, to whom a duty of support was owed, resided. The statute
requiring a parent to support his or her illegitimate child applies in any
case where the child is a bona fide resident of North Carolina at the time
of the institution of the proceeding for support, regardless of the place
of conception or birth of the child.264 The court cited authorities to
support its position that the father is properly indicted and tried for
the offense of failure to support his child in the state where he has per-
mitted the child to become dependent, irrespective of the fact that he
resides in another state. While the court also concluded that the de-
fendant was "constructively present" in North Carolina where the con-
sequences of his acts in Virginia culminated in a crime, it did not need
to rely on the dubious doctrine of constructive presence. The court
properly reasoned that the harm proscribed by the statute occurred in
North Carolina where the consequences of defendant's willful failure to
support his illegitimate child had their effect. Thus, the court's position
238 N.C. 206, 77 S.E.2d 632 (1953).
264 N.C. GEzN. STAT. § 49-3 (1950) provides as follows: "Place of birth no con-
sideration. The provisions of this article shall apply whether such child shall have
been begotten or shall have been within or without the State of North Carolina:
Provided, that the child to be supported is a bona fide resident of this State at the
time of the institution of any proceedings under this article."
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was clearly in accordance with the traditional common law territorial
theory of jurisdiction: jurisdiction over crimes is determined by the situs
of the impact of the injury. Here the defendant, outside of the state, put
into operation forces which produced the result of his willful failure to
support his illegitimate child in North Carolina. That result was crimi-
nal under the laws of North Carolina ;265 therefore, North Carolina, under
the principle of State v. Hall,266 had jurisdiction over the offense and
could try the accused whenever it could also obtain jurisdiction over his
person.
26 7
The principle of the Tickle case was incorporated into the statutory
law the same year that case was decided. The 1953 General Assembly
enacted a new statute which eliminates, in the prosecution of a parent
charged with the willful neglect or refusal to support his child, the de-
fense that he or she was not present at the time the alleged nonsupport
began, and, therefore, had committed no crime in this state. The new
act provides that "the offense of willful neglect or refusal of a father to
support and maintain his child or children, and the offense of wilful
neglect or refusal to support and maintain one's illegitimate child, shall
be deemed to have been committed in the State of North Carolina when-
ever the child is living in North Carolina at the time of such wilful
neglect or refusal to support and maintain such child. '268 Under this
"I N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-2 (Supp. 1959). It may be noted also that the offense
of willful failure to support an illegitimate child is a continuing offense. State v.
Johnson, 212 N.C. 566, 194 S.E. 319 (1937). The willful failure to support, as a
continuing offense, is deemed committed at the residence of the person to whom the
duty of support is owed. Under this theory, the defendant in the Tickle case was
committing the offense in North Carolina, and therefore North Carolina only
needed jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in order to prosecute him for
the crime. The question of venue has not been discussd very much in the North
Carolina nonsupport cases. At common law venue, as well as jurisdiction, is fixed
at the situs of the crime; and as a general rule, where the crime charged is the
failure to do a legally required act, the place fixed for its performance fixes the
situs of the crime. This requirement of venue states the public policy that fixes
the situs of the trial in the vicinage of the crime rather than the residence of the
accused. Johnson v. United States, 351 U.S. 215 (1956). To the effect that venue
is in the county of the residence of the one to whom the duty of support is owed, see
State v. Hooker, 186 N.C. 761, 120 S.E. 449 (1923) ; State v. Beam, 181 N.C. 597,
107 S.E. 429 (1921). In prosecutions under the bastardy statutes, venue may be
laid in the county where the mother resides or is found, where the putative father
resides or is found, or where the child is found. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-5 (1950).
114 N.C. 910, 19 S.E. 602 (1893).
'17 But that as to some crimes the physical presence of the accused at the place
where the crime is committed is not essential to his guilt is well settled. "The con-
stitutional requirement is that the crime shall be tried in the State and District
where committed, not necessarily in the State or District where the party commit-
ting it happened to be at the time." Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 387
(1906). Justice and the policy behind the nonsupport statutes would seem to call
for an assumption of jurisdiction in cases of this type. Where the defendant is
present in the jurisdiction during his trial, and is represented by counsel, the main-
tenance of an action against him would not be violative of due process requirements
nor offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
2 I N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-325.1 (Supp. 1959). Probably due to an oversight, the
statute, as worded, appears to apply only to the father of a legitimate child, but to
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statute and the Tickle decision, when the offense charged is the willful
neglect or refusal by a parent to support his or her child, legitimate or
illegitimate, the offense is deemed committed in North Carolina if the
child to whom the duty of support is owed is residing in North Carolina
at the time of the willful failure to support it. This is true regardless
of the residence of the parent at the time. There may be, however, the
practical problem of obtaining in personam jurisdiction of the accused.
If the accused comes into the state only momentarily, 200 as he did in the
Tickle and Fowler 70 cases, he may be arrested on a nonsupport charge
on the ground that he is still committing the offense, which is a con-
tinuing one. On the other hand, if the delinquent parent does not come
into the state voluntarily, he may be brought in by extradition proceed-
ings, if the state in which he resides is a party to the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act,271 which, unlike the federal Interstate Rendition Act,
2 72
does not require the presence of the accused in the demanding state at
the time of the commission of the crime.
273
It is in a case where a husband is charged with the dual element
offense of abandonment and nonsupport of his wife that the problem of
jurisdiction presents the greatest difficulty.274 As has been pointed out
either parent of an illegitimate child. Since N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-322 makes it a
criminal offense for either parent willfully to neglect or refuse to support his or her
legitimate child, it would seem that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-325.1 was intended to apply
to either parent also.
269 Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-68, a section of the Uniform Act To Secure the
Attendance of Witnesses From Without a State in Criminal Proceedings, a non-
resident witness coming into or passing through the state is exempt from criminal
or civil process in connection with matters which arose prior to his entrance into
the state. In view of the fact that the offense of willful failure to support one's
child is defined as a continuing offense, it would seem that such a nonresident wit-
ness would be amenable to arrest on a nonsupport charge on the theory that the
witness is then committing a criminal offense, and therefore his arrest is not sought
in connection with matters which arose before his entrance into this State" within
the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-68. Nonresidents under arrest for crime are
not privileged from being arrested on another criminal charge while in the state.
See State v. Tickle, 238 N.C. 206, 77 S.E.2d (1953).
270 Fowler v. Ross, 196 F.2d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
I7 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-55 to -84 (1953), as amended, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-78,
-80 (Supp. 1959).
272 See note 252 supra and accompanying text.
- See note 253 supra and accompanying text.
274 As has been pointed out earlier in this article, the legislature dispensed with
abandonment as an essential element of the offense as against the child under N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-322 when it amended that section in 1957 to provide, in effect, that
the willfull neglect or refusal to provide adequate support for the child, whether or
not the child has been abandoned, constitutes an offense. In addition, abandonment
is not an essential element of the offense of willful neglect or refusal to support an
illegitimate child under § 49-2. It is particularly noteworthy that § 14-325.1, which
was enacted in 1953 to fix the situs of nonsupport offenses against a child, legitimate
or illegitimate, in North Carolina whenever the child is living in this state at the
time of failure to provide support, refers to "the offense of willful neglect or re-
fusal of a father to support and maintain his child," (here meaning legitimate child).
There was no such offense as the willful neglect or refusal to support a legitimate
child prior to the 1957 amendment of § 14-322, except as to the extent that the will-
ful neglect of the father to provide adequate support for his child while living with
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previously, the willful failure to support the wife alone while living
apart from her is not an offense ;275 failure to support must be preceded
by.abandonment, and the abandonment, as well as the failure to support,
must have taken place in North Carolina. If North Carolina had adopted
the view that the failure to support is a continuing offense-committed
at the residence of the one to whom the duty of support is owed, regard-
less of the presence of the one who owes the duty of support-the same
result reached in the Tickle case could be reached in a case where the
husband is charged with the failure to support his wife. But unfortu-
nately, abandonment is an element of that offense; and the view that
has been taken of the element of abandonment as an act of separation
from the wife-implying withdrawal of physical presence-and the con-
clusion that the offense as to the wife is not a continuing one, preclude
the court from reaching the desirable result of the Tickle decision in
such a case. Either the statute, N.C. Gen Stat. section 14-322, should
be rewritten to provide that "if any husband shall willfully neglect or
refuse to provide adequate support for his wife, whether or not he
abandons her, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor," or abandonment as
an element of the offense of willful failure to support a wife should be
eliminated. Failing that, abandonment should be redefined as a continu-
ing offense, which it is possible to commit without being present at the
residence of the person to whom the duty of support is owed, along the
lines suggested in the discussion above.2 7 This would increase the effec-
his wife, constituted an offense under § 14-325. It was consistentl- held that aban-
donment was an indispensable element of the offense as against a child under § 14-
322, and that it had to be alleged in the indictment or warrant and proved. Ap-
parently, the significance of the wording of § 14-325.1 and its possible effect on the
offense under § 14-322 went unnoticed. It is interesting to note that all of the
cases decided between 1953, when § 14-325.1 was enacted, and 1957, when § 14-322
was amended, continued to regard the offense of failure to support a child as a dual
element offense requiring proof of abandonment as well as neglect or refusal to
support. State v. Outlaw, 242 N.C. 220, 87 S.E.2d 303 (1955) ; State v. Lucas,
242 N.C. 84, 86 S.E.2d 770 (1955); State v. Smith, 241 N.C. 301, 84 S.E.2d 913
(1954). Although the court in Lee v. Coffield, 245 N.C. 570, 96 S.E.2d 726 (1957),
refers off-handedly to the willful failure to support a child as a misdemeanor the
context indicates that the court was probably making a kind of short-hand reference
to the offense rather than thinking in terms of the technical legal requirements of
the offense.
"' It is not an offense under N.C. Gen Stat. § 14-322. However, the willful
neglect to provide adequate support for the wife, while living with her, in the
absence of any abandonment of her, is an offense under § 14-325.
"' See notes 254 to 262 supra and accompanying text. The difficulties with
respect to jurisdiction where abandonment is an element of the offense of nonsup-
port are due in part to the tendency of the courts to equate the concepts of aban-
donment in the law of nonsupport and "abandonment" or "desertion" in the law of
divorce. For purposes of divorce or legal separation, abandonment, or desertion,
does not necessarily involve nonsupport; it means a wrongful separation without
cause from the other spouse, regardless of the question of support, and it occurs
only one time-when the deserter actually leaves the familial abode. In the law of
support, however, separation of the husband from his wife, or a parent from his
child, usually is of no concern unless coupled with nonsupport (except where aban-
donment alone is made an offense, as in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-326). The emphasis
is on support, and the objectives are to secure to the wife and children the support
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tiveness of the criminal law as a means of enforcing duties of support.
As the law stands now, however, where a husband is charged with
the abandonment and nonsupport of his wife, jurisdictional problems will
continue to militate against the effective use of criminal sanctions to
enforce the duty of the husband to support his wife. Illustrative of this
point is the recent case of Fowler v. Ross, 2 7" a habeas corpus proceeding
in which it was held that the violator of a suspended sentence, given
him on condition that he support his family, could not be extradited
from the District of Columbia to North Carolina because he was absent
from North Carolina, the demanding state, at the time the alleged crime
was committed. The petitioner had deserted his wife and minor chil-
dren in the District of Columbia, and subsequently the wife and the
children moved to North Carolina. On his only visit to North Carolina
petitioner was arrested for willful abandonment and nonsupport. He
pleaded guilty and was given a suspended sentence on condition that he
resume supporting his family. Petitioner returned to the District of
Columbia, where he was later arrested on an extradition warrant for
failure to comply with the support requirement of his suspended sen-
tence. On appeal from the denial of his petition for habeas corpus by
the United States District Court, the Court of Appeals reversed and
ordered the petitioner released. It held that even though petitioner had
been convicted, he could not be extradited bcause he was not actually
present in North Carolina when both the acts of abandonment and
failure to support were committed. In this case extradition was sought
under the Interstate Rendition Act,278 which has been consistently in-
terpreted to require that the accused must have been present in the
demanding state at the time that the alleged crime was committed. The
majority of the court ruled that the petitioner's guilty plea after an
involuntary appearance in North Carolina was not a waiver of his right
to resist extradition, and that the Constitution,279 the statute, and pre-
vious cases compelled the use of the presence test in the instant case.
The "presence at the time of the crime" requirement in extradition
cases is one of the numerous obstacles to effective interstate enforcement
of family support duties. In the Fowler case the court extended the
to which they are entitled and to protect the public purse from the burden of pro-
viding for persons who could otherwise be maintained by members of their fami-
lies. Some states have recognized this distinction and have taken the position that
the duty of support is a continuing one which follows the family deserter; conse-
quently he may be prosecuted wherever he may be found, regardless of the where-
abouts of his dependents. Commonwealth v. Acker, 197 Mass. 91, 83 N.E. 312
(1908). North Carolina clearly recognizes this distinction also. See Pruett v.
Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 23, 100 S.E2d 296, 303 (1957), where the court said "abandon-
ment under G.S. § 50-7(1) is not synonymous with the criminal offense defined in
G.S. § 14-322." However, apparehtly the wording of § 14-322 precludes the court
from construing the offense as to 'the wife under that section as a continuing one.
277 196 F.2d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1952).. 1" 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1959).
279 U.S. CoicsT. art. IV, § 2.
[Vol. 38
THE PROBLEM OF FAMILY SUPPORT
requirement to a case in which the person whose extradition was sought
had already been convicted in the demanding state by a court which had
jurisdiction over him. Admittedly, the conviction would have been void
and of no effect if the convicting court lacked jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter, since jurisdiction in that respect cannot be conferred by con-
sent or waiver. However, it was not entirely clear that the North Caro-
lina court did not have jurisdiction of the subject matter. Since the
state law was uncertain on the point,280 it would seem that the petitioner
should have been left to his remedies in the demanding state, and the
writ of habeas corpus denied.
A justification for the presence requirement is that it prevents a state
from extending its criminal laws beyond its territorial limits; but in the
Fowler case the petitioner was present in North Carolina while com-
mitting the nonsupport element of the offense and the court which con-
victed him had jurisdiction over his person. The fact that the petitioner
committed a part of the crime within the state, by willfully failing to
support his wife and children who were residing in the state, should
have been sufficient to satisfy the requirements for extradition under
the rule in Strassheim v. Dailey,281 which held that extradition may be
granted under the Interestate Rendition Act if the accused committed
within the demanding state any acts constituting a part of the crime,
although the crime was completed in his absence. In State ex rel Lea v.
Brown,282 the only case involving the question of whether one convicted
in the demanding state but not present there at the time of the crime
could be extradited, a state court, in a unanimous decision rendered in
the form of two conflicting opinions held that the accused could be extra-
dited. Half of the court took the position that the accused had waived
the right to resist extradition by voluntarily appearing for trial; the
other half concluded that the presence test was inapplicable where the
accused had been corporally within the legal custody and jurisdiction of
a court of the demanding state, had been convicted, and subsequently had
departed the state.
Thus it can be seen that the abandonment and nonsupport cases
present numerous and difficult problems with respect to jurisdiction and
extradition. One accused of abandonment and nonsupport is more likely
to have been absent from the prosecuting state at the time the offense was
allegedly committed than one accused of almost any other crime, with
2'The uncertainty on this point would seem to be due to the fact that the
Fowler case involved the wife as well as the children, rather than to the fact that
the case arose prior to the decision in State v. Tickle, 238 N.C. 206, 77 S.E.2d 632
(1953).
-82221 U.S. 280 (1911)..8 166 Tenn. 669, 64 S.W.2d 841 (1933), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 638 (1934).
1959]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the possible exception of conspiracy and offenses involving accessories.
Extradition, perforce, is difficult and frequently impossible to obtain.
The absence of flight from the demanding state, the sine qua non of the
fugitive from justice concept, bars extradition of the family deserter
under the federal extradition statute. In addition, the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act, section 6 of which was expressly designed to provide
for the extradition of persons not present in the demanding state at the
time of the crime, has been strictly construed in some states. Conse-
quently, extradition has been denied under section 6 where the extradi-
tion papers described the accused as a fugitive from justice in a case
where he was not present at the time of the crime,28 3 the extradition
papers did not contain a formal allegation in the language of the statute,28 4
and where the warrant was defective in that it recited as authority for
extradition the "Constitution and laws of the United States. '28 5  Then,
too, the fact remains that, even under section 6 of the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act, the courts have been reluctant to extradite a person who
was never at any time in the demanding state.
There are still other barriers to the effective interstate enforcement
of support duties. While the procedure for extradition is clear,28s as a
practical matter the process of extradition is slow and expensive, and
it does not assure the abandoned family that they will get the much-
needed support. Moreover, requests for extradition are frequently
denied by governors of asylum states for numerous reasons: extradition
may be sought under the federal statute and the accused is not a fugitive
from justice because he was not present in the demanding state at the
time of the crime; the accused may be a law abiding citizen who has
established a new family unit in the asylum state; or there may be indi-
cations that the accused will not be accorded fair treatment in the de-
manding state. The granting of requests for extradition is entirely dis-
cretionary with the governors of asylum states and if they deny such
requests there is no recourse from the denial.2 87
283 Ex parte King, 139 Me. 203, 28 A.2d 562 (1942) ; Ex parte Kaufman, 39 N.W.
2d 905 (S.D. 1949). Contra: People ex rel Kaufman v. O'Brien, 97 Misc. 1019, 96
N.Y.S2d 401 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (treating words "fugitive from justice" as "mere
surplusage").
Ex parte Brewer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 388, 143 P.2d 33 (1943)..85 Stobie v. Barger, 129 Colo. 222, 268 P.2d 409 (1954).
288The mechanics of extradition are substantially as follows: (1) the chief
executive of the state which is seeking to have the accused turned over to its law
enforcement officers must demand, in a "requisition," the accused as a fugitive from
justice; (2) the demand or requisition must be accompanied by a copy (certified
by the chief executive) of the indictment or other accusation charging the accused
with having committed a crime in the demanding state; (3) the chief executive of
the asylum state must order that the accused be arrested and held for the agents of
the demanding state."", Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861).
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VIII
RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT
The problem of forcing husbands and parents to support their wives
and children, although difficult in any case, can be met-and some meas-
ure of success achieved in coping with it-as long as the members of
the family remain in one state. Enlightened legislation has removed
many procedural obstacles to civil enforcement of support duties, and
criminal proceedings are readily available in every jurisdiction. How-
ever, in most cases today family deserters abscond to other states, thereby
creating a problem of interstate enforcement of support duties. It is at
the level of interstate enforcement that the traditional remedies, civil
and criminal, have broken down and proved inadequate to cope with a
problem that has now reached enormous proportions. In fact, there is
no effective civil remedy available to compel absconding deserters to
support their dependents. The difficulties of obtaining jurisdiction of
person, property, and subject matter, conflict of law problems, the diffi-
culties of enforcing foreign support orders and judgments, and the costs
of litigation are some of the obstacles to effective civil enforcement of
support duties. On the other hand, the use of the criminal law to
enforce the duties of support has also been ineffective in the cases where
the delinquent breadwinner has fled from the state. The patchwork of
criminal abandonment and nonsupport statutes; the wide divergence as
to the interpretation, scope and purposes of the statutes; the difficulties
of obtaining, and the high cost of, extradition; problems of venue; and
above all, the requirements of jurisdiction-which are more stringent in
criminal than in civil proceedings-operate to render criminal enforce-
ment of family support even less effective and less practicable than civil
enforcement. In addition, undesirable consequences of criminal prose-
cution, such as loss of status and reputation making it difficult for the
convicted deserter to obtain employment, the aggravation of financial
difficulties by imprisonment of the breadwinner, and the intensification
of intra-family animosity, contribute to the general unsatisfactoriness
of the criminal remedy as a means of enforcing duties of support. The
acuteness of the problem of family support and the lack of effective
methods of coping with it made the development of a new approach
imperative. Reciprocal enforcement of support legislation, based on
interstate cooperation, seemed to furnish the solution to the problem of
family support.
Within the past few years all fifty states, the District of Columbia,
Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have enacted some form of
reciprocal legislation for the interstate enforcement of support duties.
All of these jurisdictions except New York288 and the Virgin Islands28 9
'88 In 1948, New York enacted the first reciprocal type statute, the Uniform
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have adopted the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.210
This statute was designed primarily to provide a procedural device for
supplementing 291 pre-existing remedies, common law and statutory, civil
and criminal, under the law of the enacting state. Although there is
some argument to the contrary with respect to the operation of certain
provisions292 of the act, it was not intended to effect changes in the sub-
stantive law of support in the adopting states. "Each state will enforce
its own laws as before so long as the husband remains in the state, and the
new act is meant to improve enforcement where the parties are in dif-
ferent states.
'293
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, popularly
called the Fugitive Husband's Law or the Runaway Papa Act, has cre-
ated a somewhat novel approach to the problem of nonsupport. It has
been pointed out earlier in this article that the criminal prosecution of
a family deserter is frequently unsatisfactory. The husband or father
may be compelled to leave a state where he has found employment; the
ill feelings resulting from this forcible uprooting instigated by the aban-
doned wife may make reconciliation impossible; the deserter must stand
trial, and if he is convicted, he may be fined (and generally, he is finan-
cially incapable of paying a fine) or jailed; or if he is released on proba-
tion, he may adamantly refuse to work; and finally, the convicted deserter
is thenceforth stigmatized to such an extent that he will, in all probability,
have difficulty in finding any worthwhile employment in the future. The
Reciprocal Act obviates these undesirable consequences of the use of the
criminal process to enforce support duties. It provides a simple two-
state procedure29 4 whereby the obligee 9 5 may initiate an action in the
Support of Dependents Law, Laws of New York 1948, ch. 790. That statute, which
has been amended several times, is still in force in New York. In Landes v. Landes,
1 N.Y.2d 358, 135 N.E.2d 562, 153 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1956), it was held that the pro-
cedure did not violate the compact clause, the due process clause, or the equal
protection clause of the Federal Constitution. The New York statute is sufficiently
similar to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act to permit reciprocity
between New York and the jurisdictions which have adopted either act.
89 The Virgin Islands enacted the Uniform Support of Dependents Law. 16
VIGmI Is. C. § 391-429 (1957).
2190 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52A-1 to -20 (Supp. 1959). See A Survey of Statutory
Changes in North Carolina in 1951, 29 N.C.L. REv. 351, 423 (1951). North Caro-
lina enacted the original Uniform Act of 1950 with minor modifications. In 1955,
North Carolina amended its act extensively to bring it in line, substantially, with the
Uniform Act of 1952, an amended version of the original act.
... N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52A-5 provides: "The remedies herein provided are in addi-
tion to and not in substitution for any other remedies."
"2 The provisions appear in N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 52A-3 (6), -5, and -8. See
extensive discussion in Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Support Duties, 42
CALm'. L. REv. 382 (1954).
Commissioners' Prefatory Note to 1950 Act, 9C UNIFoRm LAWs ANN. 1, 4.
Briefly, this two-state proceeding is as follows: It opens with an action (N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 52A-9) which normally will be commenced in the state where the family
has been deserted (the initiating state, § 52A-3 (2)). A simplified complaint (veri-
fied) is filed (§ 52A-10). The judge looks it over to decide whether the facts show
the existence of a duty of support and if they do, he so certifies and sends copies
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state where she is then residing, which will be forwarded to and com-
pleted in the state where the obligor 29 6 is found. The procedure involves
only a minimum of expense to the parties and the state, limited almost
entirely to court costs and postage for the transmission of papers and
the payments. Due process is preserved because each party pleads in a
court in his own jurisdiction.
297
Although a general discussion of the operation of the Uniform Re-
ciprocal Enforcement of Support Act is beyond the scope of this article,298
it should be noted, apropos the previous discussion of jurisdictional
problems in nonsupport cases, that the act has provisions for criminal
enforcement as part of the over-all scheme of interlocking civil and
criminal remedies. One section299 of the act provides for the interstate
rendition of persons charged with criminal liability for nonsupport; and
of the complaint, certificate, and the act to a court of the responding state (§ 52A-
11). That court will take the necessary steps to obtain jurisdiction of the husband
or father, will hold a hearing (§ 52A-12), and if the court finds that a duty of sup-
port exists, it may order the defendant to furnish support (§ 52A-13), and will
transmit a copy of its order to the court in the initiating state (§ 52A-14). To
enforce compliance with its orders, the court may subject the defendant to such
terms and conditions as it may deem proper, may require him to furnish bond or
make periodic payments, or in case of refusal, may punish him for contempt (§ 52A-
15). It has the duty to transmit to the initiating court any payments it receives
and upon requst to furnish a certified statement of those payments (§ 52A-16).
The initiating court must receive and disburse the payments (§ 52A-17).
Other sections of the act provide that the husband and wife are competent, and
may even be compelled to testify as witnesses (§ 52A-18), and for simplified rules
of evidence (§ 52A-19).
"' "Obligee" means any person to whom a duty of support is owed. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 52A-3 (8) (Supp. 1959).
2" "Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support. N.C. Gmq. STAT.
§ 52A-3 (7) (Supp. 1959).
2" For a discussion of choice of law problems under reciprocal enforcement of
support legislation see Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra note 292, and Chernak, Nonsupport
Actions and the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement Support Act, 46 J. Caim. L., C.
& P.S. 519, 524-25 (1955).
28 For a discussion of the North Carolina act see A Survey of Statutory Changes
in North Carolina in 1951, 29 N.C.L. REv. 351, 423 (1951) ; A Survey of Statutory
Changes in North Carolina in 1955, 33 N.C.L. REV. 513, 550 (1955). The act was
interpreted by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Mahan v. Read, 240 N.C. 641,
83 S.E.2d 706 (1954), 34 N.C.L. Rr-v. 126 (1955). See also Brockelbank, The
Problem of Family Support: A New Uniform Act Offers a Solution, 37 A.B.A.J.
93 (1951) ; Chernak, op. cit. supra note 297.
'0 Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act § 5, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52A-6
(Supp. 1959), provides as follows: "The Governor of this state (1) may demand
from the governor or any other State the surrender of any person found in such
other state who is charged in this State with the crime of failing to provide for the
support of any person in this State and (2) may surrender on demand by the
governor of any other state any person found in this State who is charged in such
other state with the crime of failing to provide for the support of a person in such
other state. The provisions for extradition of criminals not inconsistent herewith
shall apply to any such demand although the person whose surrender is demanded
was not in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the crime and
although he had not fled therefrom. Neither the demand, the oath nor any pro-
ceedings for extradition pursuant to this section need state or show that the person
whose surrender is demanded has fled from justice, or at the time of the commis-
sion of the crime was in the demanding or the other state."
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another section 300 is designed to encourage voluntary compliance with
the civil enforcement procedure under the act.
The interstate rendition provision of the statute, unlike section 6 of
the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act,301 expressly provides for the
extradition of a person charged with the crime of nonsupport, notwith-
standing the fact that he was not present in the demanding state at the
time the crime was committed and has not fled from that state, thus
obviating the difficulties which have heretofore plagued the interstate
enforcement of support duties. The constitutionality of this provision
has been challenged, but it has been upheld as valid in several state
decisions.
30 2
A companion provision303 of the act provides for relief from the opera-
tion of the interstate rendition provision upon compliance by the obligor
with a support order of the asylum state. This relief provision has been
construed to contemplate the prior commencement of a civil proceeding
under the act in the initiating state as a condition precedent to the
obligor's submission to the jurisdiction of the responding state for volun-
tary compliance with an order rendered by a court of the responding
state after a hearing in which the defendant obligor was given an oppor-
tunity to be heard. Thus, it was held in Ex parte Floyd30 4 that a father
could not avoid extradition from California to Ohio, where he was
charged with the crime of failing to support his wife and minor child, by
initiating support proceedings in California under the purported authority
of section 6 of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act and
complying with the order of the California court for the support of his
wife and child in Ohio. Unfortunately, under this construction of the
"relief from extradition" provision of the statute, it is possible that the
purpose of the enactment, which is to encourage voluntary compliance
with support orders and make it unnecessary to resort to the expensive
process of extradition, will be frustrated in those cases in which the
obligee, perhaps out of a spirit of vindictiveness, refuses to institute a
proceeding for support.
As would be expected in any ambitious legislative scheme, particularly
one in the still largely uncharted field of interstate cooperation, a few
... Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act § 6, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52A-
7 (Supp. 1959), provides as follows: "Any obligor contemplated by G.S. 52A-6,
who submits to the jurisdiction of the court of such other state and complies vith
the court's order of support, shall be relieved of extradition for desertion or non-
support entered in the courts of this State during the period of such compliances:
Provided, however, that an obligor may not upon his ex parte petition avail himself
of the provisions of this chapter."'0' N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-60, discussed in Part VIII sujpra.
.o2 Harrison v. State, 38 Ala. App. 60, 77 So. 2d 384 (1954), cert. denied, 262 Ala.
701, 77 So. 2d 387 (1955) ; State ex rel Bryant v. Fleming, 195 Tenn. 419, 260
S.W.2d 161 (1953) ; Ex parte Coleman, 157 Tex. Crim. 37, 245 S.W.2d 712 (1951).
303 See note 300 .tpra.
30,43 Cal. 2d 379, 273 P.2d 820 (1954), 24 Cim. L. Rav. (N.Y.) 139 (1955).
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difficulties have been encountered in the practical operation of the recipro-
cal support legislation. Some of these have already been eliminated or
ameliorated by amendments and by judicial decisions rendered with a
view toward effectuating the over-all purpose of the legislation, which is
primarily to provide an effective remedy for deserted dependents in
cases where the family breadwinner has moved across state lines in an
effort to avoid his support obligations. If it is not the ultimate solution
to the problem of family support, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act certainly appears to be a step in the right direction.
CONCLUSION
The difficulties inherent in obtaining and enforcing a support order
in a civil action have been rendered practically prohibitive as a conse-
quence of the increasing frequency with which family deserters have been
crossing state lines. The complications of personal jurisdiction, full
faith and credit, comity and reciprocity then operate to make civil reme-
dies for the enforcement of support largely ineffective. As a result of
this, a solution to the pressing problems of abandonment and nonsupport
has been sought in the criminal law; and now all states have statutes
providing for the criminal prosecution of those who willfully neglect or
refuse to perform their duties of support.
First, it should be noted that the use of the criminal law to supple-
ment the remedies available in civil actions against a husband, parent, or
child who is derelict in his or her duties to provide support actually
represents a departure from the traditional conception of the objectives
of the criminal law. Under the older view, which was reflected in the
earlier criminal statutes on abandonment and nonsupport and still is
reflected in the statutes of a few states, the primary purposes of criminal
sanctions are to deter the wrongdoer from engaging in the particular
proscribed anti-social behavior, and, by example, to deter others from
engaging in similar behavior; to punish the wrongdoer for his offense
against society; and to protect the community from the consequences of
the wrongdoer's transgression of the law, namely, the financial burden
of providing for abandoned wives, children, and parents. The use of
the criminal process to accomplish broad social objectives is not alto-
gether undersirable, however.
Second, a question arises as to whether, in the final analysis, the
criminal remedy is an adequate and effective means for coping with the
increasingly acute problem of family desertion and nonsupport. The
shortcomings of criminal prosecution for the enforcement of support are
many. Criminal prosecution means that a social stigma will be attached
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to those who are otherwise law-abiding citizens; it aggravates and in-
tensifies the mutual grievances and antagonisms of the family circle, and
militates against any possible reconciliation or voluntary cooperation.
In the cases where the family deserter has left the state and the extradi-
tion process must be resorted to, the cost of the procedure, and other
obstacles, may operate as a deterrent. Further, as a practical matter,
law enforcement agencies are not enthusiastic about prosecuting family
deserters. This is partly due to the ever increasing load of criminal
cases to be prosecuted; partly due to the nature of family support cases,
as affording little opportunity for politically ambitious prosecutors to
gain prestige and public acclaim; and partly due to the fact that fre-
quently grand juries are reluctant to indict, governors are reluctant to
extradite, and petit juries are reluctant to convict as a criminal one whose
delinquency may be due to a run of "hard luck," or other mitigating
factors.
It is the belief of some segments of the public, particularly sociolo-
gists, psychologists, social workers, the public welfare people, and some
lawyers, that attempting to cope with abandonment and nonsupport
through criminal prosecution is a superficial approach to the whole prob-
lem, and one not calculated to reach the underlying causes of broken
homes and family irresponsibility, nor designed to cure the deep-rooted
social conditions which give rise to family desertion. This may, of course,
be true; nevertheless, there is a need for immediately effective measures
that will at least alleviate a staggering problem. That this is generally
recognized is indicated by the fact that there has been a clearly discern-
ible statutory trend toward more and better criminal legislation for the
enforcement of support, buttressed by a new legislative scheme-recipro-
cal support legislation-designed to supplement existing remedies, civil
and criminal, and remove heretofore insurmountable barriers to the
effective interstate enforcement of support duties.
Reciprocal support legislation, now adopted, gratifyingly, in all states
and territories, represents a commendable effort on the part of the states
to cope with the nation-wide problem of family support by minimizing
the operation of those concomitants of a system of multiple sovereignties
which have heretofore precluded any effective interstate enforcement of
support duties-namely, doctrines of territorial limitations and in per-
sonam jurisdiction, and controversies over conflict of laws, full faith and
credit, and comity. It is perhaps too early yet to ascertain just how
effective the reciprocal support legislation has been in alleviating the
pressing problems created by the rapidly increasing number of deserted
dependents who must look to the welfare agencies, and ultimately the
overburdened taxpayers, for assistance. In any event, the legislation is
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certainly the most practical method thus far advanced for dealing with
the problem of family support in our highly mobilized society. While
it is no panacea, it promises to afford a workable solution to that prob-
lem if administered in the spirit of the underlying purpose of the
legislation.
